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Abstract 
 
In 2010, the 111th Congress passed the first national health care reform in the 
United States, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). This landmark 
legislation is intended to “fix” a health care system renowned for decreasing access and 
escalating costs.  This paper examines one of the principal reforms in the ACA, the state 
health insurance exchanges.  The author finds theoretical and empirical evidence to 
support the exchanges’ potential (in conjunction with other relevant ACA reforms) to 
increase access, decrease insurers’ excess profits and shift health care costs away from 
those least able to afford them.  The exchanges fall short of becoming a panacea, 
however, as they leave a large number of people uninsured, even in optimal scenarios.  
Thus, the exchanges are essentially another band-aid for the system which covers 
additional people, yet does not cure the U.S. health care system’s ills. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the first national health care reform to become law, expectations and criticisms 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) abound.  This paper 
will attempt to address expectations and criticism of a central part of the reform, the state 
health benefit exchanges.  The exchanges are intended to improve access to health 
insurance and health care and are part of the cost-containment mechanisms in the ACA.  
Due to the complexity of the ACA and the health care system in the U.S., this paper will 
focus mainly on health insurance markets and the health insurance exchanges.  Related 
areas, such as insurer-provider and provider-consumer interactions will be referenced 
indirectly as necessary to examine the health insurance market.  To fully understand the 
functions of health insurance exchanges, the major ACA reforms affecting the exchanges 
will also be examined.   
The first chapter of this paper, Historical Background, will provide a brief history 
of health care in the U.S. and introduce the concepts of the individual mandate and the 
health insurance exchange.  The history of U.S. health care describes how the existing 
U.S. health care system was formed over time by policies reacting to the changing 
economic, political and social environment, rather than an overarching view of health 
care.  This illustrates how health care in the U.S. evolved into a complex and 
disorganized system that excludes a portion of the population from obtaining affordable 
health insurance (and health care) as costs continue to rise.  The following sections 
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describe the origins of the ideas of the health insurance exchange and the individual 
mandate, two of the central features of the ACA examined in this paper.  The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the health care reform in the U.S. since the beginning of 
the 20th century, including recent proposals that include health insurance exchanges and 
the individual mandate.  This section emphasizes the incrementalist approach that the 
U.S. has historically employed when attempting to reform the health care system.  This 
section complements the earlier section on the history of the U.S. health care as it 
describes the reform efforts that occurred in response to, and because of, the conditions 
existing during different time periods. 
In the second chapter, the economics behind the health care exchanges is 
discussed, and applied to the exchanges outlined in the ACA.  First, the economic theory 
is applied to health insurance markets to explain why the current system fails to achieve 
certain outcomes, and how health insurance exchanges could correct these failures.  Next, 
the main provisions in the ACA that affect the insurance exchanges, as well as 
regulations for the exchanges themselves are explained.  Special emphasis is placed on 
the flexibility given to states in designing their exchanges.  Finally, economic theory is 
applied to the health care exchanges in the ACA to make general predictions about the 
effects of various design choices. 
The third chapter will explore existing models of the outcomes of the ACA in the 
U.S. that are based on economic theory.  These models simulate the responses of 
individuals and businesses to different ACA regulations and exchange designs. Although 
the results of these models vary and must be interpreted with caution, their results are 
generally similar and in line with the economic theory described in the previous chapter.  
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These models will be used to discuss the potential results of implementing the current 
ACA reform, eliminating the individual mandate from the ACA, and the more radical 
approach of creating a single payer system.  All of these scenarios represent currently 
possible implementations of the reform.  The following section describes states’ progress 
in establishing exchanges and their design choices as of the writing of this paper.  This 
chapter will conclude with a closer examination of Colorado’s health insurance exchange, 
including a simulation modified for Colorado-specific conditions.  Finally, the author will 
answer the question in the title of this paper to conclude whether health insurance 
exchanges are a panacea or merely a band-aid. 
Throughout this paper, the terms “health insurance exchange,” “health benefits 
exchange” and simply “exchange” are used interchangeably.  Health insurance 
companies are referred to as “health insurers,” “insurers,” or “insurance carriers.”  Health 
plans offered by health insurance companies are referred to as “health plans” or simply 
“plans.” 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
A Brief History of the U.S. Health Care System 
The current U.S. health care system evolved from a series of historical events and 
political decisions over the last century.  These were mostly the product of beliefs and 
circumstances particular to their time, rather than an overarching vision of health care, 
which has resulted in the complex and somewhat unmanageable system that exists today.   
 
The Precursors to Modern Health Insurance: Early 20th Century 
As the Industrial Revolution shifted work from rural farms to urban factories, the 
population also shifted towards the cities.  This shift left the newly urbanized population 
exposed to the occupational hazards of factory life at a time when they were separated 
from the extended family networks which had previously provided them with support 
during times of need.  During this time period, physicians usually visited patients at home 
and, given the still rudimentary state of medical technology, there was little they could do 
for many illnesses.  As a result, medical expenditures were generally very low, and the 
amount lost in wages due to an accident or illness was often much greater than the cost of 
treatment.  Thus, by the end of the 19th century, many workers obtained some type of 
accident, sickness or burial insurance that was offered by fraternal organizations, labor 
unions and private insurers (Austin and Hungerford 2009, 2).  These insurance policies 
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were mostly indemnity plans which would distribute a predetermined amount of cash in 
the event of a serious illness or accident. 
Although most insurance at the time protected against economic losses due to 
accidents, the first plans to actually cover medical services began to emerge, albeit slowly 
and in a very limited scope in the lumber, mining and railroad industries.  The Western 
Clinic in Tacoma, Washington, is credited with being the first plan to cover medical 
services during the 1870s and 1880s.  The plan paid doctors a fixed monthly fee to 
provide members with needed medical services.  The very first group health insurance 
policy was created shortly thereafter, in 1910, and it offered employees of Montgomery 
Ward and Company an indemnity plan insuring against wages lost as a result of sickness 
or injury (Scofea 1994, 3). 
 
The Beginning of Modern Health Insurance:  The Great Depression and the Blues 
Modern health insurance on a large scale was originally conceived as insurance to 
cover hospitals and providers against unpaid bills.  In 1929, an executive of the Baylor 
University Hospital in Dallas, Texas noticed a large number of unpaid bills accumulated 
by local teachers.  To relieve this burden from the hospital (and the teachers) the Baylor 
University Hospital created an insurance plan providing certain hospital services as 
needed to teachers who paid a monthly premium of $6 (Melissa Thomasson 2010).  As 
the Great Depression continued, the problem of unpaid hospital bills became even more 
pervasive as an increasing number of people were unable to pay for their hospital care.  
According to Laura A. Scofea of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “more than 100 hospitals 
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nationwide had failed in the first years of the Depression and those that remained in 
business had only about a 50-percent occupancy rate” (Scofea 1994, 3). 
Hospitals began offering insurance plans similar to the Baylor plan to stabilize 
their revenues.  The American Hospital Association began creating Blue Cross plans, 
which allowed members access to most, if not all hospitals within a city.  By 1939, 25 
states had passed legislation enabling hospital insurance plans, many of which designated 
Blue Cross plans as charities and exempted them from various insurance regulations and 
taxes (Starr 1983, 298).  Soon after, similar plans, called Blue Shield plans, were 
developed for physician services.  As charitable community organizations, Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield plans (the Blues) typically used a community rating to determine 
premiums (as opposed to experience rating often used today).  Under this arrangement all 
covered individuals within a plan pay the same amount, so those with the lowest health 
care costs subsidize those with higher health care costs. 
At the same time, the first Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) were being 
developed on the West Coast.  These provided a wider range of medical services to 
members from specific providers for a predetermined rate.  The first of these was created 
in 1929 by two physicians, Donald Ross and H. Clifford Loos, who agreed to provide 
medical care for employees of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power for a 
prepaid monthly fee.  An HMO which would become one of the largest and most widely 
known in the country, Kaiser Permanente, was also formed during the 1930’s (Scofea 
1994, 5).  As the Blues proliferated and the first HMOs were being organized, the 
influential American Hospital Association (AHA) and American Medical Association 
(AMA) worked to stifle competition between providers and insurance plans which they 
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argued would threaten the financial stability of the health care industry.  This was the 
beginning of what Bodenheimer and Grumbach call the “provider-insurer pact” which 
dominated the health care industry until the 1970s.  (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2008, 
194) 
 
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Public Programs:  WWII to 1960s 
By 1940, 10% of the population of the United States was covered by some form 
of health insurance (Scofea, 1994, 6).  As World War II progressed, and available 
domestic labor decreased, businesses which could no longer compete by increasing 
wages due to war-time controls began offering health insurance as a benefit to attract 
employees; this was even beneficial to employers as the Internal Revenue Service 
considered health insurance premiums paid by employers as necessary business expenses 
rather than taxable income received by the employee (codified in Section 106 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1945).  Employer-offered or employer-sponsored insurance 
continued to grow during the post-war prosperity enjoyed by U.S. business which 
encountered strong demand for their products and weak competition from abroad.  
Unions, which were also gaining strength, were able to extract generous benefits, 
including health insurance, from employers.   During this time, the provider-insurer pact 
assured the success of the Blues which dominated an uncompetitive and rapidly growing 
insurance market.  The Blues, and eventually, new commercial health insurers, accepted 
generous reimbursement rules set by providers who were members of the AHA and 
AMA.  Health care costs were driven up as hospitals invested in the newest and most 
expensive technologies and a greater number of physicians moved away from primary 
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care towards more profitable specialized medicine. The cost of hospital care, for 
example, doubled during the 1950s (Healthcare Timeline).  Providers and insurers were 
able to pass these costs on to businesses and consumers because of the prosperous 
economy and the preferred tax treatment of employer contributions towards health 
insurance.  According to National Health Expenditure Accounts data compiled by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, national health expenditures reached 5.2% 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1960. (National Health Expenditure Accounts) 
The Blues’ success convinced commercial insurers to enter the market.  By the 
end of the 1950s, commercial health insurers were successfully competing against the 
Blues and cutting into their market share.  Commercial plans undercut the Blues by using 
experience rating to set premiums, rather than community rating.  Experience rating 
allowed commercial insurers to offer “healthier” individuals and groups lower premiums 
than the Blues, which did not adjust their premiums according to risk.  Moreover, 
commercial health insurers used a variety of methods to prevent enrollment of sicker 
individuals into their plans, including outright refusal of coverage.  Thus, not only were 
commercial insurers attracting healthier individuals away from the Blues, but they were 
also leaving them with the sickest and most costly individuals.  This created an adverse 
selection problem for the Blues as they adjusted their premiums upwards to cover the 
costs of their sicker enrollees, which only intensified their problem as the remaining 
relatively healthier enrollees switched to cheaper commercial health insurance.  In order 
to compete with commercial plans, the Blues were eventually forced to convert to 
experience rating to formulate premiums. 
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According to National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data, the percentage of 
nonelderly persons (under age 65) with hospital insurance increased over 10% between 
1959 and 1968, reaching 79.3% in 1968, mostly in employer-sponsored insurance (Cohen 
et al. 2009, 4).  As the connection between employment and health insurance 
strengthened, certain segments of the population, particularly the elderly, low income 
workers and the unemployed, were unable to purchase health insurance or pay for 
medical care.  Although insurance plans for individuals had been offered alongside group 
plans (they accounted for around 21% of all hospital insurance coverage by 19501) many 
were unable to afford these plans.  During the 1950s this became a subject of serious 
social and political concern and resulted in federal aid through several initiatives.  These 
efforts culminated in the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, which 
created the Medicare and Medicaid programs to provide health care for the individuals 
over the age of 65 and low-income and disabled individuals. 
 
The Rise of Managed Care and Industry Consolidation: 1970s to 2000s 
Although health care costs had risen during the previous decades, these were 
generally absorbed by employers who were enjoying their relative prosperity.  By the 
1970s, however, U.S. industry was beginning to face competition from Western Europe 
and Japan which, combined with growing inflation, drastically changed the country’s 
economic environment.  As businesses and state and federal governments were forced to 
watch their budgets more closely, rising costs in the health care sector could no longer be 
                                                 
1Calculations based on historical health insurance data in the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Historical Statistics of 
the United States—Colonial Times to 1970,” Vital Statistics and Health and Medical Care, Series B 401-
412. 
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overlooked and became an area of major concern.  Between 1960 and 1970, national 
health care expenditures increased from 5.2% to 7.2% of GDP—by 1980, this percentage 
grew to 9.2% (National Health Expenditure Accounts).  This was the beginning of the 
end for the provider-insurer pact as conflicts between insurers and providers ensued.  
Insurance companies, facing increased pressure to contain rising premiums, demanded 
that hospitals and other providers lower their costs as well.  The legal separation in 1972 
of Blue Cross and the American Hospital Association, which had historically influenced 
the insurer’s operations, exemplified the break between providers and insurers  
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2008, 196). 
Businesses, which were now the main source of health insurance for individuals 
began to demand lower prices from health insurers.  Many large employers moved 
towards self-insurance, an arrangement which allowed employers to bear the risk of their 
employees’ health care expenditures while using health insurance companies for 
administrative tasks only.  The federal and state governments also pressured insurers to 
decrease their costs through payment reforms in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  
In an attempt to control costs, the health insurance industry moved towards managed care 
arrangements which included prospective payments to providers.  Rather than paying 
providers a fee for individual services, plans made periodic (usually monthly) payments 
to provider per member to cover the costs of services provided during that time period.  
Managed care plans integrated “the financing and delivery of appropriate health care 
services to cover individuals” and used selective contracting among providers to foster 
competition and decrease costs.  These plans also included substantial financial 
incentives for members to use providers in the provider network and procedures covered 
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by the plan.  The passage of the HMO Act of 1973 led to a proliferation of HMOs as it 
provided federal subsidies for the creation of prepaid group practices and required certain 
employers offering health insurance to also offer an HMO plan if requested by 
employees.  HMOs gained popularity until the 1990s when Preferred Provider 
Organizations (PPOs) attracted consumers away from the unpopular HMO restrictions; 
PPOs allowed a wider choice of providers and greater service flexibility.  From 1968 to 
1980, the percentage of nonelderly persons with private insurance remained steady at 
79%.  Due to population growth, however, the total number of nonelderly insured persons 
increased by 9.6% (Cohen el al. 2009, 4).  After the initial growth of the Medicaid 
program following its implementation, the number recipients of public health assistance 
as a percentage of the nonelderly population reached 12% by 1988.  The individual 
insurance market covered 9% of the nonelderly population and accounted for only 14% 
of health insurance market coverage (excluding public assistance).2 
Changes in U.S. economic conditions, particularly the economic downturns 
during the early 1980s and early 1990s, affected the rate of employer-sponsored health 
coverage.  Between 1988 and 1995, the percentage of nonelderly persons with employer-
provided health insurance decreased from 66% to 64%.3  It is likely that a significant 
portion of this decrease was in insurance coverage by smaller employers for whom any 
cost increases or profit decreases would have a larger impact compared to larger 
employers.  At the same time, the percentage of nonelderly individuals with public 
                                                 
2
 Calculations based on March 1898 Current Population Survey data found in the Employee Benefit 
Research Institute publication, EBRI Issue Brief “Update: Americans Without Health Insurance,” July, 
1990 No. 104.  Totals may not equal 100% as some individuals may have multiple sources of insurance. 
3
 Calculations based on March 1898 Current Population Survey data in the EBRI Issue Brief No. 104 and 
on March 1996 Current Population Survey data found in the EBRI Issue Brief "Sources of Health Insurance 
and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 1996 Current Population Survey," November 
1996 No.179.  Totals may not equal 100% as some individuals may have multiple sources of insurance. 
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insurance increased from 12% to 17%.  As public insurance absorbed some of the 
decrease in employer-sponsored insurance, it mitigated the potential increase in 
uninsurance to only 1%, to reach 17% in 1995.  Individual insurance market participation 
as a percent of all health insurance (excluding public assistance) decreased to 11%.3   
In this economic environment, increased competition between insurers and 
between providers slowed the growth of health care costs during the 1990s (Healthcare 
Timeline).  During the 1980s national health care expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
had increased by 3%, from 9.2% to 12.5%.  Between 1990 and 1999, the growth in 
national health care expenditures slowed to 1.3%, increasing to 13.8% of GDP in 1999  
(National Health Expenditure Accounts).  The federal government passed payment 
reforms that allowed it to decrease Medicare and Medicaid inflation and employers were 
able to bargain with managed care organizations for lower premiums which cut into the 
profit margins of health care providers and insurers.    To survive this competitive 
environment, both insurers and providers merged and consolidated to increase their 
bargaining power.  Large health insurance plans purchased smaller plans and merged 
with other plans.  Providers, particularly hospitals, also consolidated into multihospital 
systems or networks and the increasing number of physician specialists joined single-
specialty groups (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2008, 199).  This increased their 
bargaining power, allowing them to counteract cost-containing pressure from purchasers.   
 
Recent Trends Prior to the Affordable Care Act 
As the U.S. economy improved in the latter half of the 1990s, the percent of 
nonelderly persons with employer-sponsored insurance increased to 67% in 2000, while 
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uninsureds dropped to 16%.4  During the 2000s however, a recession at the beginning of 
the decade, and increased international competition from developing economies, led to 
changes in the distribution of insurance coverage and to an overall increase in the rate of 
uninsurance.  By 2010, only 59% of nonelderly persons had employer sponsored 
insurance, 7% purchased other private insurance, 22% were covered by public programs 
and 18% were uninsured.4  Once again, a rise in public health coverage mitigated 
potential increases in uninsurance.  Although commercial insurers had seen their 
enrollment in employer-sponsored insurance shrink, many began serving Medicaid and 
Medicare over the last two decades as states and the federal government opened their 
programs to commercial insurers. 
While health insurance coverage declined, health care expenditures increased 
dramatically.  From 2000 to 2010, total national health care expenditures as a percent of 
GDP increased from 13.8% to 17.9% (National Health Expenditure Accounts).  Although 
the federal and state governments account for more than half of these expenditures, 
businesses have also encountered higher costs for providing health insurance.  Small 
businesses especially, have struggled with these increases.  According to the Kaiser 
Health Benefits Summary, the percent of employers with less than 200 employees 
offering health insurance benefits dropped from 68% to 59% between 2000 and 2010 
(Employer Health Benefits 2011 Summary of Findings 2011, 5).  This decrease does not 
account for employees who decided not to purchase offered insurance due to rising 
premiums.  In their 1999 publication, Kronick and Gilmore examine the sensitivity of 
                                                 
4
 Calculations based on March 2001 Current Population Survey data in the EBRI Issue Brief No. 240 
"Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2000 Current 
Population Survey," December 2001.  Totals may not equal 100% as some individuals may have multiple 
sources of insurance. 
14 
employees to changes in health care costs by modeling the probability of being insured as 
a function of the ratio of per capita health care expenditure to personal income and other 
demographic and employment characteristics.  They find that increasing per capital 
health care expenditures account for most of the observed changes in health insurance 
coverage (Kronick and Gilmore, 1999 42).  If low-income workers are no longer able to 
afford insurance offered by their employers, the individual health insurance market would 
even be an alternative since those prices are likely to be even greater.  As a matter of fact, 
it seems unlikely that the individual insurance market has absorbed people who 
previously had employer-sponsored insurance since its enrollment has remained 
relatively steady at about 7% of the nonelderly population over the last two decades.  Due 
to the decrease in group insurance, however, individual insurance participation increased 
slightly to 12% of all health insurance (excluding public assistance) in 2010.5   
In all sectors of the health insurance market (both private and public), strong 
insurer bargaining power (and provider power to a certain extent) and the limited ability 
of businesses and the federal and state governments to absorb increasing costs, has 
resulted in a redirection of a growing portion of costs to consumers, who are generally 
price-takers.  This has sparked a trend towards “consumer-directed” cost-containment 
measures aimed at increasing consumers’ sensitivity to medical care costs and include 
increased cost-sharing, as well as less expensive plans with less comprehensive benefits.  
These cheaper plans include low-premium, high-deductible health plans that allow people 
to pay for out-of-pocket expenses through tax-advantaged Health Savings Accounts and 
                                                 
5
 Calculations based on March 2011 Current Population Survey data in the EBRI Issue Brief No. 347 
"Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2011 Current 
Population Survey," September 2011.  Totals may not equal 100% as some individuals may have multiple 
sources of insurance. 
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plans with limited health benefits.  These types of plans often fail to cover all the health 
care services individuals need and render their purchase unaffordable.  This inadequate 
health insurance is creating an ever growing group of “underinsured” persons (Austin and 
Hungerford 2009, 9).  Thus, it is increasingly the case that health insurance purchasers, 
particularly in individual and small group markets who have little bargaining power are 
unable to afford high costs and become underinsured or completely uninsured. 
 
Origins of the Health Insurance Exchange 
The current concept of the health insurance exchange evolved from the idea of 
“managed competition,” which originated during the 1970s when the lack of competition 
and insensitivity to costs described in the previous section characterized the national 
health care sector.  Although similar concepts were developed prior to Alain Enthoven’s 
first exposition, he is still regarded by most as the “father” of managed competition, since 
his has been the most thorough explanation of the concept.   
The original inspiration for his and others’ early models was the Federal 
Employees’ Health Benefits (FEHB) Program.  Through a combination of political 
circumstances rather than a distinct policy design, Congress adopted the FEHB Program 
in 1959 after a five-year battle between competing and well-organized interest groups to 
design a system to provide health benefits to federal employees.  These represented the 
entire spectrum of interests, such as the American Medical Association, the Blues, 
employee unions, insurance companies, other health care prepayment plans and the 
federal government as an employer.  As a result, many different alternatives were 
considered, ranging from a single indemnity-type medical plan for all employees, to pre-
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determined government contributions for any kind of prepaid health plan an employee 
could find on the market.  As the final compromise, the FEHB program was designed to 
offer a wide variety of competitive plan choices for employees, which reflected the wide 
variety of interests of its designers.  Through the FEHB Program, the federal government 
began offering millions of its employees, retirees and dependents throughout the country 
a choice between hundreds of different health care financing and delivery plans.   
Despite initial challenges, the overall success of the FEHB Program convinced 
various states like California and Minnesota to adopt similar programs for their 
employees and retirees.  Moreover, it sparked interest in the feasibility of developing a 
similar program on a national scale to cover the rest of the population.  In a 1967 
publication, K. L. White suggests a similar system of organized competition in the United 
States that would include “multiple, local and regional competing systems” (White 1967, 
7).  In 1971, Ellwood, McClure and colleagues proposed a national “Health Maintenance 
Strategy” in which HMOs would become the main health insurance and health care 
providers for both the private and public spheres within a highly competitive private 
market.  This paper was the basis of and the impetus for, the HMO Act of 1973, which 
removed many existing barriers to the creation of HMOs.  While serving in the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare during the Nixon administration in 1973, 
Scott Fleming designed a national health insurance model called “Structured Competition 
within the Private Sector.”  In it, he described practical ways to extend the FEHB 
Program to the whole population.  According to Enthoven, the works of Ellwood, 
McClure and Fleming served as the building blocks for his own national health plan 
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called the “Consumer Choice Health Plan,” which he proposed to the Carter 
administration in 1977 (Enthoven 1993, 27-28). 
Although each of these health care reform ideas is unique, all are examples of 
what Charles Schultze, President Carter’s chair of the Council of Economic Advisors 
promoted as the most effective reform strategy in a series of essays titled, “The Public 
Use of Private Interest” in the 1970s.  These essays described ways to achieve socially-
desirable goals while minimizing direct government intervention in economic matters and 
discouraging command-and control strategies.  The private and public actors (i.e., 
businesses and government) would create market-based incentives in areas where they do 
not already exist that would move individuals towards socially-desirable ends.  White, 
Ellwood, et al., Fleming and Enthoven apply this strategy to the health care sector (some 
unknowingly) by promoting the creation of specific incentives for a private, market-based 
system in which health care providers and insurers compete on the basis of value and 
quality.  
Since his original publication in 1977, Enthoven has modified and clarified his 
original description of the Consumer Choice Health Plan and managed competition 
several times to counter criticisms and misunderstanding.   In his 1993 publication, he 
defines managed competition as “a purchasing strategy to obtain maximum value for 
money for employers and consumers” (Enthoven 1993, 29).  Central to this strategy are 
what Enthoven calls “sponsors,” which act on behalf of a group of purchasers.  Sponsors 
ensure that eligible individuals can obtain health care services at a reasonable price by 
managing the health insurance market.  Through their various iterations, sponsors have 
also been called “purchasing cooperatives,” or “health alliances,” but are currently 
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referred to as “health insurance exchanges” or “health benefits exchanges.”  Sponsors 
represent purchasers in a particular geographic area, and actively work to correct or 
mitigate health care market imperfections which have led to decreased competition, 
poorer health outcomes, limited access for those with the greatest health care needs, and 
increased costs.  These market imperfections or market failures are more thoroughly 
explained in Chapter III. 
The character of the sponsor is vital to the success of managed competition.  
According to Enthoven, sponsors must have: 
the ability to use judgment to achieve goals in the face of uncertainty, to 
negotiate, and to make decisions on the basis of imperfect information.  It takes 
more than mere passive administration of inflexible rules to make this market 
work (Enthoven 1993, 29). 
Enthoven describes five main tasks which sponsors are required to perform in 
order to create a structure of managed competition.  First, they must establish and enforce 
rules of equity to ensure that all eligible individuals have access to health insurance.  
Ideally, sponsors would mandate that all plans accept any eligible individual and apply a 
community rating (or restricted departures from it), guarantee access (subsidized, if 
necessary) to a baseline plan, ensure continuous coverage once an individual is enrolled, 
and prohibit any limitations or exclusions based on pre-existing conditions.  Second, 
sponsors should have some freedom to select participating plans based on factors such as 
price and covered benefits.  Third, sponsors must be the only access point for eligible 
individuals to enroll in participating health plans and establish contractual payment terms 
with participants.  Fourth, sponsors must create a competitive environment in which plans 
have an incentive to increase efficiency, quality and decrease their premiums.  They may 
do so by ensuring that subsidies never exceed the lowest-priced plan so that there is 
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always an incentive to decrease the cost of a plan, standardize plans, publish quality 
information for participating plans and allow individuals to choose plans at an individual, 
rather than employment-group level.  Finally, sponsors must manage risk selection so that 
all participating plans are compensated based on the relative riskiness of their enrollees 
so that plans do not have incentives to select individuals they believe have lower risks 
(Enthoven 1993, 31-35). 
Enthoven’s idea of managed competition is based on a purchasing agent actively 
working on behalf of a group of purchasers, both individuals and employers.  Although 
current formulations of health insurance exchanges vary widely on the degree of 
“activity” performed by the exchanges, they are all built on Enthoven’s central concept of 
a collective agent that facilitates the purchase of health insurance for those with limited or 
no access.  It is interesting to note that Enthoven believes that health insurance is social 
insurance and that universal, or near universal health insurance coverage is necessary for 
the success of managed competition.  Moreover, he believes that all, or as many as 
possible, of the individuals covered must participate in the financing of the system.  
Enthoven gives various methods to ensure financial participation, including a mandate on 
employers to provide coverage to their employees, a requirement that all households 
purchase insurance or taxation, but does not seem particularly inclined towards any one 
method. 
 
Origins of the Individual Mandate 
The individual mandate is an approach to achieving universal health care in a 
system in which health insurance is the main vehicle for obtaining health care.  For some, 
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access to health care is a human right, for others it is an essential part of a just and 
humane society or a necessary prerequisite for equality of opportunity.  In a system in 
which health care is purchased through health insurance, and uninsurance is often 
synonymous with no access to health care, all individuals must obtain health insurance to 
achieve universal access to health care.  Although the idea of requiring health care 
insurance for all citizens is not new to health care policy discussions, it has generally 
been within the framework of a government-run health care system.  Another related 
idea, of an “employer” mandate requiring all employers (usually above a specified size) 
to provide their employees with some minimum health benefit package, has also been 
discussed at the national level for some time. The individual mandate in the context of a 
private-sector health care system, however, was first described by Stuart M. Butler and 
Edmund Haislmaier describe in their 1989 publication, “A National Health System for 
America.”   
The main goals of Butler and Haislmaier’s National Health System are to control 
rising health care costs and provide access to health care to a growing number of 
individuals unable to obtain needed care.  Their plan to create a “consumer-oriented, 
market-based, comprehensive American health system” requires that every resident of the 
United States enroll in a minimum catastrophic health care plan, shifting the 
responsibility of obtaining health care coverage to families rather than employers, and 
limiting the government’s role to that of monitoring and encouraging competition in the 
private health care market and subsidizing needy individuals (Butler and Haislmaier 
1989, 51-52).  In order to foster more cost-conscious behavior by health care consumers, 
which they believe is essential to controlling costs, Butler and Haislmaier’s plan 
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eliminates the tax exclusion for payments made by employers for employee health 
insurance and replaces it with tax deductions or credits to personal income tax for out-of-
pocket expenses.  This would serve to disconnect employment from health insurance 
provision.  Their plan also mandates that every individual purchase health insurance and 
pay most routine costs out-of-pocket.  Butler and Haislmaier believe this combination of 
incentives would reduce the insensitivity to health care costs experienced by the insured.  
At the same time, the government would provide financial support to those unable to 
purchase insurance or pay for necessary health care on their own. 
Butler and Haislmaier view the requirement that every resident purchase health 
insurance as part of a contract between these individuals and the U.S. government:  
in return for the government’s accepting an obligation to devise a market-based 
system guaranteeing access to care and protecting all families from financial 
distress due to the cost of an illness, each individual must agree to obtain a 
minimum level of protection (Butler and Haislmaier 1989, 52).   
This would prevent any individuals with the ability to purchase insurance from 
becoming “free riders,” who force their costs onto others in the case of an emergency.6  
Although the authors maintain that the level of mandatory protection remains to be 
debated, they do mention that all households must protect themselves from large, 
unforeseen medical costs by purchasing health insurance or face a penalty or fee.  They 
                                                 
6
 As part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA), Congress passed the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) to ensure public access to emergency services 
regardless of the ability to pay. In one of its provisions, EMTALA amends Section 1867 of the Social 
Security Act to require Medicare-participating hospitals with emergency departments to screen and treat the 
emergency medical conditions of patients in a non-discriminatory manner to anyone, regardless of their 
ability to pay, insurance status, national origin, race, creed or color.  Charity care that was once provided by 
local and state governments was shifted to hospitals, who were now obligated to care for anyone one an 
emergency medical condition, effectively making EMTALA the national health care policy for the 
uninsured.  Since hospitals do not receive direct funding from the Federal government for any such 
emergency care that they provide to the uninsured or underinsured “free riders,” they shift those 
uncompensated costs onto other patients or payers. 
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viewed this individual mandate in the context of catastrophic insurance, rather than social 
insurance as in Enthoven’s model.  
In 1991, Pauly, Damon, Feldstein and Hoff published “A Plan for 'Responsible 
National Health Insurance,’” in which they propose their own national health insurance 
structure.  Similar to the Heritage Foundation publication, Pauly et al. also require that 
everyone purchase at least a minimum level of insurance.  They also argue for 
individually mandated insurance coverage on the basis that it is both more “humane” to 
provide health care on a timely and systematic basis for everyone rather than through 
“haphazard” uncompensated care and Medicaid eligibility.  This would be less costly for 
society which would otherwise pay for this expensive haphazard care, usually given to 
the uninsured in late stages of illness.  Like Butler and Haislmaier, they suggest changing 
the tax structure so that individuals receive tax credits, rather than employers, with 
employees enjoying the tax-free treatment of their health insurance costs.  They also 
believe individuals will be more cost-conscious if they are purchasing their insurance 
themselves rather than paying a portion of the costs through their employer.  Pauly et al. 
do, however, provide more details on the minimum coverage requirement set by the 
government, which would offer a combination of preventive and acute care services 
determined to be most cost-effective and beneficial.  While the price of these plans would 
be tiered by income, those with the ability to do so would have the opportunity to 
purchase higher-cost plans with a more expansive benefit package.  Low-income 
individuals could receive tax subsidies from welfare agencies who would then receive the 
individual’s tax credit once it arrived.  
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Evolution of Health Care Reform: the Health Insurance Exchange and the 
Individual Mandate 
Although serious national health care reform efforts did not begin until after the 
Great Depression, health reforms at more than a single-state level was being proposed as 
early as 1912 when Theodore Roosevelt campaigned for national health service as part of 
the Progressive party platform (Minor/Third Party Platforms: “Progressive Party Platform 
of 1912”).  National health care reform efforts during the 1920s were limited and faced 
significant opposition as it was likened to Germany’s “socialized medicine” (Palmer, 
1999).  During the 1930s President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered, but did not 
officially propose, national health reform both before and after the passage of the Social 
Security Act in 1935 that included compulsory health insurance for residents of states 
deciding to participate in the system.  In 1945, President Harry Truman introduced a 
proposal through which the federal government would provide universal, yet voluntary, 
health insurance to all citizens.  Truman’s plan faced tremendous opposition and was 
criticized as being a gateway to socialism.  Subsequently, health care reform efforts 
subsided as access to health care and health insurance expanded during the prosperous 
post-WWII years. 
 A resurgence of interest in national health care during the 1970s produced a wide 
variety of proposals, none of which succeeded in becoming law.  Some plans, like two 
separate plans proposed by Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Martha 
Griffiths in 1970 placed the federal government as the universal, single-payer for health 
insurance or the organizer of a top-down, strictly budgeted, health care system providing 
universal health care coverage for all citizens.  Other proposals, like the Comprehensive 
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Health Insurance Act presented by President Nixon in 1974, and President Carter’s Phase 
I National Health Plan proposal of 1979 included mandates that employers provide a 
minimum level of health insurance to their employees, usually referred to as “employer 
mandates.”  The federal government would provide health care insurance to the poor, 
aged and unemployed.  Other reforms proposed some sort of income-tax credits 
dependent on family income levels that would be provided to individuals purchasing 
insurance, like the Fulton-Broyhill bill in 1970.  Other notable bills, including a proposal 
by Senator Javits in 1970, expanded Medicare to all citizens (Sommers 1971, 127-134). 
After another lull in health care reform efforts, President Bill Clinton made the 
next serious attempt at restructuring the national health care system through another 
Health Security Act which he presented in 1993.  Some of its more radical provisions 
were: 
• Employer mandate:  required employers to make premium contribution 
payments equal to those of any eligible individuals they employ.   
• Individual mandate:  No “eligible individuals” could disenroll from a 
health plan before enrolling in a different plan or Medicare. 
• Defined a minimum, standard benefit package and outlined three choices 
for cost-sharing arrangements that all plans must follow. 
• Required the state to create at least one “regional alliance.”  These 
followed the principles of managed competition described by Enthoven 
and controlled the availability of health plans, enforced health budgets, 
enrolled employers and employees in the new system, collected premiums, 
and generally enforced the national insurance rules and regulations.  
Regional alliances would provide a selection of health plans, including at 
least one fee-for-service plan, from which eligible individuals could 
choose. 
• Any individuals purchasing a plan providing wider benefits than the 
minimum benefit package could do so with their own after-tax dollars. 
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The Clinton Health Security Act proposed a radical change to the operation of the 
health insurance industry in the United States.  For various reasons beyond the scope of 
this paper, the Clinton plan was defeated.  Although it represented one of the first large-
scale plans to include both an individual mandate and the idea of a health care exchange 
or managed competition, the inclusion of an employer mandate and requirement to 
contribute to employees’ health insurance costs would have actually strengthen the 
relationship between employers and the provision of health care.  This deviates 
significantly from the ideas of individual responsibility and cost-consciousness at the 
crux of Stuart’s original concept of the individual mandate. 
Republicans countered the Clinton Health Security Act with various proposals, a 
few of which included a provision requiring individuals to purchase some type of health 
insurance.  At the time, conservatives presented the individual mandate, which supported 
ideal of individual responsibility, as a better alternative to the employer mandate in the 
Clinton plan as well as any government-run plans.  Republican bills like Representative 
Rick Santorum and Senator Phil Gramm’s “Comprehensive Family Health Access and 
Savings Act” and Representative Cliff Stearns and Senator Don Nickels’ “Consumer 
Choice Health Security Act” possessed de facto individual mandates, although they were 
not called as such, through various penalties for lack of insurance (Latino 2011).  The 
“Health and Equity Access Reform Today Act of 1993,” sponsored by Republican 
Senator John Chafee is one of the more detailed republican proposals of that time.  It 
explicitly required individuals to purchase health insurance, except for religious reasons.   
Chafee’s proposal would have created a federal Benefits Commission to set 
standards for health insurance plans.  Each state would organize purchasing groups (not 
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more than one covering the same geographical area) to accept small employers, and 
eligible employees and individuals, market qualified plans to members, enter into 
agreements with qualified plans and small employers, and enroll eligible individuals in 
qualified plans.  The purchasing groups would also disseminate information regarding 
available insurance plans.  They could accept premiums on behalf of individuals, but 
were not held responsible in cases on non-payment.  The proposal also required large 
employers to follow certain guidelines including providing a certain minimum number 
and types of plans and did not allow them to purchase health insurance through the 
individual and small employer purchasing groups.  Although employers of all sizes 
would be required to provide health insurance options to their eligible employees, they 
were not required to make a contribution towards employees’ health care coverage.  Low-
income individuals not enrolled in Medicaid would receive vouchers to help pay for 
health insurance premiums.  Chafee’s proposal essentially incorporated a health 
insurance exchange but limited its scope by excluding all large employers from 
participating.  It is interesting to note, that the Massachusetts health exchange also 
excludes regular employees (not temporary or part-time employees) of large employers. 
While interest in sweeping national health care reforms waned after the failure of 
the Clinton Health Security Act individual states embraced the idea of increasing access 
to health insurance for underserved markets through health care exchanges.  Small-group 
markets have been especially targeted as policy makers believed that health insurance 
exchanges or even purchasing pools or cooperatives would simplify and decrease the 
costs to small employers of offering health insurance.  States like New York, Utah and 
Connecticut currently operate health insurance exchanges (either publicly, through a 
27 
public-private partnership or a not-for-profit entity).  California’s small business 
exchange, the Health Insurance Plan of California (HIPC), later renamed PacAdvantage, 
began operations in 1993, but the high costs of its enrollees rendered the program 
unsustainable by 2006 (Kramer and Weinberg 2011, 2). 
Despite the apparent popularity of health exchanges or purchasing pools for the 
small-business or individual markets, these mechanisms were rarely expanded to 
encompass a greater section of the population.  In 2004, the District of Columbia 
insurance commissioner proposed legislation that would have created a state-wide 
insurance exchange.  Maryland and Massachusetts proposed a similar model in 2006.  All 
three state proposals allowed a much larger segment of the state population to benefit 
from the proposed exchange than previous proposals which were limited to small-groups.  
Unlike the Massachusetts reform which has now been implemented for 5 years, the D.C. 
and Maryland proposals did not include an individual mandate (or employer mandate).  
The Massachusetts’s health exchange, named the Commonwealth Health Insurance 
Connector Authority (the Connector), provides health insurance options to low income 
individuals in public health programs like Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance 
Plan, who receive individual subsidies.  Through a separate program, the Connector 
offers health insurance choices to individuals and families, young adults, employees, and 
small employers.  Health plans must meet certain standards to participate in the 
Connector and are grouped into four categories based on actuarial value to facilitate 
comparisons for consumers.  Individuals over the age of 18 must purchase health 
insurance, or face financial penalties.  Exceptions are made based on religion, or financial 
hardship that makes even the cheapest plan unaffordable.  While all employers with more 
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than ten full-time employees must also provide health insurance to employees or face 
financial penalties, only those with fewer than 50 full time employees may offer plans 
through the exchange.   
In 2007, the next major national health reform, the Healthy Americans Act, was 
introduced by Democratic Senator Ron Wyden.  It required all eligible adults to enroll in 
a health insurance plan, including a Healthy Americans Private Insurance Plan created 
through the bill.  The bill did not pass in 2007, and Senators Wyden and Bennett 
reintroduced the legislation in 2009.   Due to its support from both Republicans and 
Democrats, it was considered by many to be the only truly bipartisan alternative during 
the national health care reform debate that culminated in the passage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 (ACA).   
The Wyden-Bennett proposal also included an individual mandate and set forth 
penalties for those who remained uninsured but did not qualify for an exclusion (i.e., for 
religious reasons).  The plan would have gone the farthest to weaken the link between 
employment and health insurance as it required all individuals to purchase one of the 
insurance plans listed by state-run health insurance exchanges and provided generous tax 
deductions as well as sliding scale subsidies for low-income individuals.   It also required 
employers to contribute towards employee health insurance costs if they provided them 
insurance, while eliminating the current tax exclusion for employer-sponsored insurance.  
At the same time, employers could increase worker wages by the amount of health 
insurance premiums instead of making health insurance contributions (Kaiser Family 
Foundation).  While this bill more closely represented the concepts of the health care 
exchange and individual mandate than the alternatives, it was considered too radical by 
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many.  Moreover, critics were concerned that the bill would not provide a long-term 
solution to the health care problem since some of the provisions in the bill were to be 
phased out after some years.  Similar to this proposal, the national health care reform that 
finally passed in 2010, the ACA, also included an individual mandate and health 
insurance exchanges (at the state or multi-state level), but does much less to weaken the 
link between employment and health insurance.  The ACA, which is currently being 
implemented (and debated) is explained in more detail in the following chapter. 
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ECONOMICS OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
Economic Theory and the Health Insurance Exchange 
Perfectly Competitive Markets 
Although unrealistic, the neoclassical ideal of the perfectly competitive market 
provides a great starting point for the evaluation of real-life markets.  In a perfectly 
competitive market, rational economic actors act in their own self-interest, and in doing 
so, efficiently allocate available resources to produce goods valued by consumers.  This 
market requires the following characteristics to reach economic efficiency: 
• A large number of buyers and sellers.  Due to their small size and small 
market share, prices are determined by supply and demand—they are all 
price-takers.  No one seller nor buyer, may influence the market price of a 
good.  In other words, each seller faces a horizontal demand curve so that 
changing its production would change the quantity sold, but not the price.  
As a result, a seller’s average revenue is the same as the marginal revenue 
from each additional good so the market price is equal to marginal 
revenue.  Similarly, each buyer faces a horizontal supply curve, so that 
changing the quantity of goods purchased does not affect the price.  A 
buyer’s average utility is the same as the marginal utility from each 
additional good, so the market price is also equal to the marginal utility.  
Thus, in the long run, both sellers and buyers maximize their gains.  
Moreover, demand and supply are independent so that suppliers cannot 
influence buyers’ demand. 
• Goods in the market are homogenous so that any one may be substituted 
for another. 
• There is perfect information so that all sellers know the prices and costs of 
other sellers and all buyers know all sellers’ prices.  Additionally, all 
buyers have complete knowledge regarding the good they are purchasing 
and all sellers have access to the same technology. 
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• Firms do not encounter any barriers to the entry into, or exit from the 
market. 
• There are no transaction costs so that neither buyers nor sellers incur 
additional costs when making a transaction. 
• There are no externalities from the production or consumption of a good.  
All costs or benefits from a transaction are captured by its price. 
If all conditions are satisfied, the market for a good is completely competitive 
and, according to Neoclassical theory, the market will function efficiently.   
 
Health Insurance: Market Failure 
Due to the complicated nature of the health care system, and the current emphasis 
on health care insurance as the main vehicle for receiving health care services, this paper 
will focus on the relationship between health care consumers and health care insurers 
while indirectly referring to issues regarding providers.   More often than not, markets do 
not actually satisfy all conditions of perfect competition, in which case the markets “fail” 
to bring about economic efficiency.  Although most markets experience market failures, 
the market for health care and health insurance is exceptional in that it does not satisfy 
any of the conditions for perfect competition.  As a result, health care resources are not 
allocated efficiently and goods (i.e., health insurance and health care) are not produced in 
the appropriate quantity at the appropriate price to maximize the welfare of all 
participants.  Moreover, goods are priced higher than in a perfectly competitive market 
and undersupplied.  As will be explained below, the existing market favors the suppliers 
of health insurance over consumers, or potential consumers, of health insurance, allowing 
the former to reap substantial gains at the expense of the latter. 
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Size Matters: Industry Concentration 
The health care system is largely characterized by a substantial level of 
concentration of providers, certain purchasers, and insurers.  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, large hospital systems and multi-physician groups have become quite 
common.  Some large purchasers, such as the federal government, are able to set prices or 
establish restrictive pricing mechanisms though Medicare and FEHB, states through 
Medicaid, and some very large employers.   Similarly, most health care researchers agree 
that the health insurer consolidations over the last few decades have resulted in highly 
concentrated health insurance markets.  In a 2004 study James Robinson examined 
concentration in the health insurance industry for 47 states and the District of Columbia 
and found that the largest three insurance companies controlled at least 50% of the 
market in all but three states (Robinson 2004, 13).  A study conducted by the AMA in 
2007 using the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission guidelines, found 
that the combined HMO and PPO markets were highly concentrated in over 90% of 
metropolitan statistic areas (Competition in health insurance: A comprehensive study of 
U.S. markets: 2007 update, 5).  A 2004 study by the Government Accountability Office 
focusing on the small group health insurance market also found a high degree of insurer 
concentration in most states (Austin and Hungerford 2009, 27-28). 
The degree of concentration in the health insurance industry is aided by the 
presence of diseconomies of small scale and the nature of pooling.  The unit costs for 
health insurers decrease as they increase in size, so a large number of competing insurers 
would result in higher unit costs.  On the other hand, a monopolistic insurer would 
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probably exploit decreased unit costs and inflate its prices to increase its profit.  In either 
scenario, the market would fail as some consumers would not be willing to pay the 
inflated prices for insurance.  Various studies, however, have found that health insurer 
concentration allows them to extract lower prices from large hospital associations and 
other provider groups, thereby countering the potential bargaining power of providers 
(Melnick, Shen and Wu 2011, 1730).  It is unclear whether insurers, especially 
commercial insurers responsible for increasing shareholder value, would pass lower costs 
on to smaller consumers.  Several studies have found “little empirical evidence on 
competitive conduct by health insurance firms” (Dafny 2010, 1399).  Leemore Dafny 
considered whether insurers can affect prices by examining their ability to extract rents 
from large employers when the latter experience positive profit shocks.  Dafny concluded 
that insurers, even in markets with 10 or fewer insurers and particularly in markets with 6 
or less insurers, were able to extract price increases from employers whose profits had 
increased.   
 This data supports the popular belief that the health insurance market is 
oligopolistic, with a few, large sellers dominating the market.  As a result of their size, 
these large, dominant sellers no longer face a horizontal demand curve, but rather a 
downward-sloping curve, which allows them to influence prices by altering production.  
These sellers are able to price goods above their marginal costs such that the quantity 
demanded (and supplied) at this higher price is lower than what it would be in a perfectly 
competitive market.  The high prices and low supply of health insurance resulting from 
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this structure are exacerbated further by the presence of additional failures in health 
insurance markets. 
 
 Insurance Product Heterogeneity 
Health insurance products are many and varied.  There are several types of health 
insurance plans represented by various letter combinations:  HMOs, PPOs, CDHPs 
(Consumer Directed Health Plans) with HSAs, and whichever new products insurers are 
enthusiastically devising.  This variety is compounded by the fact that these plans 
contract with different providers, who undoubtedly provide care of varying quality.  
According to Austin and Hungerford, the demand for health insurance is a function of an 
individual’s level of risk aversion, the variability of medical expenses, the effectiveness 
and level of benefits covered by the insurance, income, premiums and the level of cost-
sharing (Austin and Hungerford 2009, 15).  Thus, the different insurance products which 
provide different benefits, and often different levels of cost-sharing, are not perfect 
substitutes. 
 
Imperfect Information 
Insurance products and the health care they cover are very difficult to understand.  
The heterogeneity of insurance products makes understanding products and product 
differences difficult for consumers.  Moreover, insurance contracts are incredibly 
complex and insurance companies have been known to make them even more difficult to 
understand if they believed that it would increase their profits.  At the same time, 
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information regarding the quality of benefits and providers covered by a plan is difficult 
to obtain and examine.   Health and health care services are also difficult to understand 
and require many years of specialized training and certification.  Thus, not only would 
average or even above average consumers find it incredibly difficult to understand 
insurance products, they would also find it difficult to know which health care services 
they need.  As a matter of fact, consumers rely on physicians to tell them what services 
they need.  This creates a “principal-agent” problem because the physicians may have 
incentives to act in their own best interest rather than their patients’.  This is of particular 
concern in fee-for-service models where physician payment is positively correlated to the 
amount of services they provide, or if certain services are reimbursed above cost.  
Asymmetries of information between consumers and insurers and the inherent 
uncertainty in future health care needs also result in adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Consumers have more information about their own health care needs than insurers.  As a 
result, insurers may price premiums so that relatively healthier people are not willing to 
pay the premiums.  If this occurs, the overall premiums for the remaining group of 
insured people will rise as the overall “health” of members is poorer.  As premiums 
increase, those with lower expected health care costs will forego coverage.  If this 
continues, insurers are forced to charge high premiums which leave high-risk consumers 
unable to afford the premiums and prevent lower-risk consumers who would be willing to 
pay for lower premiums, from purchasing insurance.  Although only the latter case 
represents adverse selection, since a good that individuals would be willing and able to 
purchase is not offered, society generally disapproves of both types of uninsurance. 
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In order to avoid this, health insurers have tried to attract healthier customers 
through experience rating which calculates their premiums based on previous health care 
experience, and by offering cheaper, specialized insurance products. At the same time, 
they have tried to discourage enrollment of sicker customers by charging unaffordable 
premiums, refusing to cover expensive services based on pre-existing conditions or 
refusing to cover sicker customers altogether.  This process of “skimming” or “creaming 
off” was used by commercial insurers to compete against the Blues who were left with 
the sickest and most costly enrollees.  High-risk pools created by various states have had 
limited success due to adverse selection. Since sicker individuals are more likely to pay 
more for insurance, they increase the cost of care, while healthier, low cost clients who 
would help balance the risk pool, forego the expensive insurance.  The insurer is thus left 
with only the most expensive, sicker enrollees.  Research on the subject spanning three 
decades suggests that adverse selection is quantitatively large (Austin and Hungerford 
2009, 17).  Adverse selection is especially problematic in the individual and small group 
markets since the baseline for their premiums is higher than for the large group market. 
Insurers' lack of information regarding the future health needs of their customers 
is exacerbated by moral hazard.  Individuals’ demand for health care may change once 
they are insured and result in their overconsumption of health care.  Insured individuals, 
for example, may seek care for more minor conditions, more costly procedures, or 
additional discretionary care than they would if they were not insured.  Moreover, they 
may engage in more risky behaviors or unhealthy habits since they know they may easily 
access health care if need.  As a result, insurers may pay more for consumers’ health care 
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than the consumers themselves, had the latter paid for services with their own money.  In 
a similar vein, individuals may wait until they become sick to purchase health insurance 
or switch to a plan with more comprehensive coverage provided by unknowing insurers.  
Insurers attempt to prevent this by limiting enrollment periods to specific, limited time 
periods, usually only once a year.  Providers may also engage in moral hazard if they 
alter their provision of health care based on differences in compensation they receive for 
different procedures.  If they receive compensation above their costs for certain 
procedures, for example, they may recommend those procedures more often than they 
would otherwise and more often than procedures for which they receive a lower 
compensation. 
 
Barriers to Entry and Exit 
Entry into the health insurance market is incredibly difficult due to a variety of 
factors.  The health insurance industry is complex and requires specialized knowledge.  It 
would take significant education and training to understand insurance products as well as 
insurance financing and risk pooling.  In order to enter the health insurance market, a 
firm would have to create a network of providers and bargain with pharmaceutical 
companies; it would have to compete against the generally large and established insurers 
with existing connections to physicians in the area.  An entrant would also have to 
compete with existing firms for customers.  It is not difficult to imagine large existing 
insurers dropping their prices to undercut a new entrant.  Existing firms also have stable 
reputations and well-developed marketing campaigns, which would make it difficult for a 
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new entrant to become established.  While entry into the market is obviously challenging, 
regulations preventing insurers from discontinuing coverage may also make it difficult to 
exit the market. 
 
Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs in the health insurance industry are relatively high.  The cost of 
obtaining information on health insurance products and making an informed choice are 
inversely related to the size of the group seeking insurance.  Larger groups are able to 
spread the cost of searching for the appropriate health insurance across more individuals, 
while the smallest group, an individual for example, must often work with an insurance 
broker who understands insurance products and charges customers a fee for using his 
knowledge.  Similarly, health insurers include a loading fee in their premiums that 
includes administrative costs and profits.  Larger groups enjoy economies of scale as 
loading costs can be spread across more enrollees, who pay a lower fee individually, 
compared to smaller groups.  As a matter of fact, a recent study examined the loading 
fees for employers of varying sizes. On average, loading fees for employers with less 
than 100 employees were 34% of premiums while those for employers with 100 to 
99,999 employees were 15%, and those for employers with 100,000 or more employees 
were 4% (Abraham, Karaca-Mandic and Phelps 2011, 181). 
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Externalities 
Most researchers agree that there is a significant correlation between health 
insurance coverage, and access to health care and health outcomes.  As a result, the 
provision of health insurance is closely related to the provision of health care, or lack 
thereof.   The provision of needed health care has two significant positive effects on 
parties outside of the health care transaction and potentially society as a while.  First, 
healthy individuals are less likely to spread communicable diseases and are more 
productive workers.  Second, as Donaldson and Gerard explain, certain members of 
society receive a “caring” externality from knowing that another person is receiving 
necessary health care.  This is often characterized by the concern people may have for 
those who are less well-off (Donaldson and Gerard 2005, 41).  Since health care is so 
intimately tied to well-being, many in society believe that access to necessary health care 
services should not be denied based on someone’s inability to pay.  Just as the provision 
of health care has positive externalities, the lack of health care has negative externalities.  
If access to necessary vaccines or other services is denied, certain contagious diseases, 
for example, could spread throughout the population.  If altruistic or caring persons find 
out that susceptible individuals are not receiving needed health care, they may be 
negatively affected.  This group includes people who research and support changes in the 
health care system with the goal of improving access to care for those who would 
otherwise be neglected. 
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The provision of health insurance has an additional effect, as it prevents free-
riding.  Free riding occurs when individuals are unable to pay for the care they receive.  
This happens when the uninsured or underinsured encounter a medical emergency or 
illness and seek treatment.  Although hospitals and physicians receive some public funds 
for uncompensated care through the Medicaid program, they may not be fully 
compensated for their services.  As a result, hospitals and physicians increase their costs 
to regular consumers to offset their losses resulting from free riders.  Ultimately, tax-
payer funds allocated towards uncompensated care and premiums paid by the uninsured 
increase.   
  
Role of Health Insurance Exchanges in Correcting Market Failures 
According to Enthoven’s conception of managed competition, “sponsors” or 
“health insurance exchanges” would able to correct many of the market failures present 
in the health insurance and health care industries.  By actively working on behalf of a 
group of buyers who would otherwise be fragmented, exchanges would essentially form a 
large buyer, converting the individual and small group markets into bilateral oligopolies 
(with a small number of buyers and sellers who have substantial market power).  
Exchanges could even create monopsonies to counteract the market power of the insurers 
if all purchasers in one market joined the exchanges.  While Enthoven thoroughly 
described managed competition and the role of sponsors in correcting failures in health 
insurance markets, his explanation of the economic theory behind their workings was 
relatively superficial.  Economic theory regarding bilateral oligopolies where a few 
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buyers and a few sellers have substantial market power is not as well developed as theory 
for perfect competition or where substantial asymmetries between sellers and buyers exist 
(i.e., there is one monopoly, one oligopoly, or imperfect competition among sellers) and 
can become complex and include bargaining or game theory.  There is a growing interest, 
however, in theories and studies on the countervailing power of large buyers to offset the 
market power of existing, oligopolistic sellers.  Although Enthoven did not discuss 
countervailing power, sponsors bear a striking resemblance to the consolidation of buyers 
which John Kenneth Galbraith believed would emerge to counteract the increasing 
market power of sellers. 
The term “countervailing power” was coined by Galbraith in 1952 in his book on 
American Capitalism.  Galbraith claims that American capitalism is no longer 
characterized by competition in its classical form, but rather is mostly controlled by large 
corporations which are able to exercise significant market power (Galbraith 1952, 109).  
Galbraith disagrees with the classical belief that competition is a self-generating force as 
the large profits derived by firms with market power inspire competition to obtain part of 
those profits.  Instead, he argues that barriers to entry into markets with large existing 
firms are so great that competitors rarely enter those markets.  A different self-generating 
force, however, does appear to restrain the power of the large corporation in the place of 
competition: 
In fact, new restraints of private power did appear to replace competition.  They 
were nurtured by the same process of concentration which impaired or destroyed 
competition.  But they appear not on the same side of the market but on the 
opposite side, not with competitors but with the customers or suppliers… I shall 
cal it countervailing power. (Galbraith 1952, 111) 
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Galbraith supports his theory of countervailing power by citing the abundance of 
strong buyers in the majority of non-retail U.S. industries.  Galbraith also distinguishes 
his theory of countervailing power from bilateral monopoly, as countervailing power 
allows buyers to create competition between small groups of sellers in an otherwise 
uncompetitive market.  This is one of sponsors’ essential roles in Enthoven’s model of 
managed competition.  Thus, the author discusses existing literature on market structure 
and countervailing power to provide insights into the potential for sponsors (or health 
insurance exchanges) to foster competition and correct market failures. 
Empirical studies based on Galbraith’s theory of countervailing power in the 
health care system have generally concentrated on the relationship between insurers as 
the buyers and health care providers, particularly large hospitals, as the sellers of health 
care.  Several studies find that large insurers are able to extract discounts or lower prices 
from providers.  J.B. Herndon analyzes the interaction between managed care plans and 
physician unions in the market for health care.  She finds that the traditional monopsony 
model (in which the monopsonists’ ability to extract lower prices decreases the quantity 
of health care supplied by physicians) does not explain her observations of that market.  
Instead, Herndon suggests an “all-or-none” model of monopsony to illustrate how 
monopsony managed care plans are able to extract lower prices from physicians while 
maintain the same quantity of care.  As the sole purchasers in the model, monopsonies 
are able to bargain with providers to reduce their prices for the same quantity of services.  
They are able to do so because providers know that if they are unable to contract with a 
monopsony, the monopsony can easily contract with a different group of providers. 
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(Herndon 2002, 200).  Although the all-or-none model is applied to a monosponistic 
market, the model may be extended to oligopsonistic markets.  If single buyers represent 
a large enough portion of the market, they may force existing sellers to compete with 
each other and decrease their prices rather than lose that volume of sales to another seller.  
Similarly, Enthoven’s sponsors would change the rules of the game and act as 
gatekeepers which allow insurers access to their market. 
Other studies find empirical evidence that increased consolidation among health 
insurers has allowed them to extract lower prices in concentrated hospital markets  
(Moriya, Vogt and Gaynor 2010, and Melnick, Shen and Wu 2011).  Gaynor, Moriya and 
Vogt examine how insurer and hospital market concentration affect the prices of hospital 
services using panel data spanning three years for transaction prices for health care 
services for over 11 million Americans with private insurance.  The authors use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure industry concentration and find a 
statistically significant correlation between increased insurer concentration and decreased 
prices for hospital services.  Interestingly, they find that increased hospital concentration 
is not significantly correlated with increases in the prices for hospital services.  This may 
be because the hospital markets are already substantially concentrated.  Melnick Shen 
and Wu use two years of data on prices of hospital services and managed care 
organizations (MCOs) covering 90% of the U.S. to examine the relationship between 
concentration among hospitals and among MCOs.  They find that, despite the increase 
concentration among health insurers, more than 90% of hospitals still operate in markets 
where hospital concentration exceeds health plan concentration.  In markets with the 
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greatest health plan concentration, however, hospital prices are approximately 12% lower 
than in more competitive health plan markets (Melnick, Shen, Wu 2011, 1730-1731). 
These studies on the interaction of insurers and providers with different levels of 
market concentration indicate than an increase in buyer concentration can result in 
decreased prices for goods without decreasing the quantity supplied.  This accepts the 
assumption that firms in more concentrated industries are able to reap larger than normal 
profits.  In increasing the market power of buyers, some of the benefits enjoyed by the 
firms, in the form of excess profits, will be transferred to buyers, in the form of lower 
prices for goods.  Thus, since the health insurance industry is significantly more 
concentrated than insurance purchasers, especially in the individual and small group 
markets, research suggests that health exchanges could potentially provide purchasers 
with substantial benefits through lowering premiums (prices).  If exchanges are able to 
extract premium decreases from insurers, this would have the additional benefit of 
increasing access to care to those who are able to afford lower premiums.   
Enthoven’s model of managed competition gives health insurance exchanges 
(acting as “sponsors”) substantial powers and responsibilities to mitigate or correct other 
market failures.  As representatives of a large group of buyers, the market share of health 
insurance exchanges would allow them to use their countervailing power to change the 
rules of the health insurance market.  To foster additional competition among health 
insurers, exchanges would encourage and support efforts of new insurers to enter the 
market.  To foster competition among providers, exchanges would divide providers into 
competing units rather than allowing them to contract with most plans in their area.  
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Exchanges would also try to correct informational asymmetries by disseminating 
information to consumers on health plan contracts, benefits, costs, quality and customer 
satisfaction.  They would select similar or standardized plans that would reduce the 
degree of heterogeneity in health insurance products.  This would facilitate comparison 
shopping and limit adverse selection.  To mitigate risk selection by insurers, exchanges 
would ensure that health plans are able to accurately price the health care costs for 
potential enrollees through appropriate risk rating and require continuity of coverage for 
enrollees.  Exchanges would also provide subsidies to lower costs sufficiently so that 
individuals would be willing to pay for insurance rather instead of potentially needing a 
“free ride” in the future. 
 
The Affordable Care Act and Health Insurance Exchanges 
After a year-long debate in Congress between several competing proposals, 
President Barak Obama signed the first comprehensive national health care reform 
legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) on March 23, 2010 
(Public Law 111–148).  A week later, President Obama signed the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-152), which amended portions of 
the ACA (and included some student loan reforms).  To limit potential confusion, the 
author refers to the amended health care reform law as the ACA. 
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General Provisions 
The ACA includes a variety of reforms affecting most areas of the health care 
system, ranging from expansions of public programs to initiatives aimed at increasing the 
health care workforce, especially for the provision of preventive and primary care.  The 
major areas of reform are summarized below: 7 
• An individual mandate requiring all U.S. citizens and legal residents to 
have a minimum level of health insurance coverage or face a tax penalty 
of “up to $695 per year to a maximum of three times that amount per 
family or 2.5% of household income” that will be phased in through 2016 
(Summary of New Health Reform Law 2011, 1). 
• Provision of premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies to low-income 
individuals up to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) on a sliding 
scale. 
• A “play-or-pay” provision requiring employers with 50 or more full-time 
employers to offer health insurance coverage or pay a fee.  Provides 
several levels of tax credits for small businesses with up to 25 employees 
depending on their size. 
• Medicaid eligibility expansions (to be implemented by 2014) and 
increased federal financial participation for the newly eligible.   
• Medicaid and Medicare payment reforms aimed at containing costs and 
increasing compensation for the provision preventive and primary care. 
• Creation of various entities (federal, state, and non-profit) to research 
strategies to improve health care provision, financing and health 
outcomes. 
• Provision of grants for public demonstration projects or research regarding 
health care innovations, particularly payment reforms, care coordination 
and value-based purchasing. 
                                                 
7
 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation provides an excellent summary of the ACA reforms in greater 
detail on its website at: http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf. 
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• Requirement that states create health insurance exchanges through which 
individuals and small-employers may purchase qualified coverage and 
outlines the exchanges’ responsibilities.  Establishment of a health 
insurance Navigator to help customers “navigate” the new exchanges. 
• New regulations on insurers to protect consumers and decrease 
administrative waste.  Standardization of various regulations across the 
individual and small-group health insurance markets, and the health 
insurance exchanges. 
• A tax on insurers of employer-sponsored plans above a certain value, and 
annual fees on pharmaceutical manufacturers and health insurers. 
The reforms contained in the ACA affect both the public and private spheres of 
the health care system by expanding public assistance and increasing regulations on 
private insurers.  They emphasize increased access to health insurance while attempting 
to control costs through payment reforms.  They support preventive and primary care and 
greater coordination in the provision of health care.  While the focus of this paper is on 
health insurance exchanges, it is important to remember that the ACA contains a set of 
provisions beyond those specific to the exchanges which also influence their success.  
Thus, a more thorough explanation of these provisions, in addition to the health insurance 
exchanges, is included in the following section. 
 
State Health Insurance Exchanges 
The ACA allows states significant flexibility in designing their own health 
insurance exchanges, which has been maintained throughout subsequent guidance from 
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) on 
their implementation.   
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Establishing Health Insurance Exchanges and Operational Requirements 
Section 1311 of the ACA provides grants to states to establish an American 
Health Benefits Exchange (for individuals) and a Small Business Health Options 
Program (SHOP Exchange) by January 1, 2014, and outlines most of their operational 
and oversight requirements.  States may choose between establishing their exchanges as a 
new governmental entity, as part of an existing State agency, or as a separate non-profit 
entity.  They may also decide not to establish an exchange, in which case the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) will “work with the State” to establish an exchange 
(Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges 2011).  States may also merge their individual 
and SHOP exchanges into one state exchange or collaborate to form regional or multi-
state exchanges.  U.S. citizens and legal aliens (who are not incarcerated) not offered 
qualified health insurance through their employers, or businesses with up to 100 
employees may participate in the exchanges.   States have the option to limit small-
business participation to those with up to 50 employees until 2016.  Exclusions from the 
individual mandate can be made based on financial hardship or religion. 
Exchanges must facilitate the purchase of qualified health plans and ensure that 
all offered plans meet certain requirements by: 
• Certifying and recertifying or decertifying offered plans to ensure they 
meet certain criteria.  
• Operating a website to disseminate information and operating a toll-free 
call center. 
• Providing information on public programs like Medicaid and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program and offered plans, including price 
and quality ratings based on a standard methodology, benefit options, 
actual costs of benefits after taking into account applicable tax credits and 
cost sharing and in-network providers.   
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• Providing plan practice data and quality improvement activities specified 
by the Secretary, such as “claims handling policies, financial disclosures, 
enrollment and disenrollment data, claims denials, rating practices, cost 
sharing for out of network coverage” (Initial Guidance to States on 
Exchanges 2011). 
• Developing a single application for public medical assistance programs 
and premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies which can be accessed 
through a web-portal or submitted in person, by phone or by mail. 
• Engaging in significant outreach activities to reach potential enrollees and 
organizing annual open enrollment periods.  Once enrolled, performing a 
customer satisfaction survey and publish the results. 
• Certifying if an individual is exempt from the individual mandate. 
• Providing data on its own operations, such as administrative expenditures, 
etc. 
• Developing easily understandable, standardized formats to present the 
different sets of information described. 
Although the ACA includes many specific and detailed requirements, states are 
given the greatest flexibility in one essential operational detail of their exchanges—the 
level of involvement in plan selection.  According to the Secretary’s guidance, 
States have a range of options for how the Exchange operates from an “active 
purchaser” model, in which the Exchange operates as large employers often do in 
using market leverage and the tools of managed competition to negotiate product 
offerings with insurers, to an “open marketplace” model, in which the Exchange 
operates as a clearinghouse that is open to all qualified insurers and relies on 
market forces to generate product offerings (Initial Guidance to States on 
Exchanges 2011). 
As states have begun planning their exchanges, the amount of flexibility allowed 
has resulted in a variety of different operational structures.  The decision between 
creating an active purchaser or a clearinghouse is highly political and often contentious, 
dividing public officials along bipartisan lines.  The different arrangements that have 
been enacted or planned by states are described in further detail in the following chapter.  
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The Federal government has supported states through this process by providing grants to 
48 states and the District of Columbia to begin planning their exchanges and will provide 
additional grants to fund their actual establishment.  Once operational, however, the 
federal government will no longer provide funding to states and will expect the 
exchanges to be self-funding (they may collect fees or otherwise generate funding for 
their operation). 
 
Health Insurance Products and Public Subsidies 
The ACA includes various health insurance market reforms which effectively 
standardize important regulations across the health insurance exchanges, the individual 
health insurance market, and the small-group health insurance market.  Although the 
reforms described below cover major areas of differences between these markets, states 
may decide to implement further regulations affecting the health insurance exchanges and 
apply those also to the individual and small-group markets in their states.  Section 1251 
of the ACA phases in provisions that will require guarantee issue and renewability of new 
health plans by 2014 by eliminating pre-existing conditions exclusions, annual and 
lifetime limits on the dollar value of coverage.  The ACA also requires health plans to 
defend annual premium increases and gives states the authority to deny “unreasonable” 
increases (as defined by HHS with input from states, the insurance industry and 
consumers).   
Section 1301 of the ACA specifies requirements for “qualified health plans” 
which may be offered through the exchange: 1) they have been certified by the exchange; 
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2) they provide the essential benefits package defined by states; 3) they are offered by a 
health insurer licensed in the appropriate State; 4) the insurance company offers at least 
one qualified health plan in the silver level and the gold level through the exchange; 5) 
they charge the same premium rate for the same plan offered through the exchange and 
an outside market;  and 6) they comply with any other necessary regulations developed 
after the passage of this legislation.  Additionally, states must offer at least two multi-
state plans through each exchange, one of which must be offered by a non-profit entity 
(Summary of New Health Reform Law 2011, 4). 
According to the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, 
“non-grandfathered plans in the individual and small group markets both inside and 
outside of the Exchanges, Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent, and Basic 
Health Programs must cover the EHB [Essential Health Benefits] beginning in 2014” 
(Essential Health Benefits Bulletin 2011, 1).  Self-insured health plans and plans 
provided through the large group market are also exempt from this requirement.  Similar 
to many other provisions, the federal government has refrained from prescribing reform 
details that states must follow.  The ACA lists 10 categories of service which must be 
covered in a state’s essential benefits package.  Recent guidance from HHS recommends 
four possible benchmark plans which are likely to cover the essential health benefits.  
These include the largest insurance products (by enrollment) in the state’s small group 
insurance market, offered to state employees, offered by the FEHB Plan, and offered by a 
non-Medicaid HMO. 
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While all plans offered through the exchange must cover the essential health 
benefits, states have the option to offer additional benefits, although these would not be 
eligible for additional federal financing.  In order to standardize the insurance market 
while allowing a variety of choices, all newly offered insurance plans must fall within 
four actuarial value levels, or offer only catastrophic coverage (for younger adults only).  
A plan’s actuarial value is determined by the percent of expenses covered by a plan for a 
standard population.  Hence, a plan with a lower actuarial value would require greater 
cost-sharing than a plan with a higher actuarial value.  The following types of plans will 
be available on January 1, 2014: 
• Bronze Plan - 60% actuarial value, with current Health Savings Account 
(HSA) out-of-pocket limits (these were $5,950 for individuals and 
$11,900 for families in 2010). This plan is the benchmark for minimum 
creditable coverage tied to the individual mandate. 
• Silver Plan – 70% actuarial value, with current HSA out-of-pocket limits. 
• Gold Plan - 80% actuarial value, with current HSA out-of-pocket limits. 
• Platinum Plan - 90% actuarial value, with current HSA out-of-pocket 
limits. 
• Catastrophic Plan – Available only to individuals up to age 30 or those 
exempt from the individual mandate.  Provides catastrophic coverage and 
limited preventive and primary care (exempt from deductibles) at current 
HSA coverage levels.  
While plans must meet the specified actuarial standards, specific cost-sharing and 
benefits structures may still vary between different plans since insurers may use a 
combination of differed copayments, coinsurance and deductibles. 
The ACA also includes provisions for premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies 
for U.S. citizens and legal immigrants with family incomes up to 400% FPL.  Premium 
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contributions are limited to certain percentages of income on a sliding scale such that 
premium contributions for the lowest income group, up to 133% FPL, are capped at 2% 
of income and for the highest income group, 300 - 400% FPL, are capped at 9.5% of 
income.  Cost-sharing is also subsidized, which effectively increases the actuarial value 
of a plan.  Table 1 below lists the available plan tiers and the effects of subsidies on the 
actuarial value provided by plans. 
Plan Tier Applies to Out-of-Pocket Maximum 
Actuarial 
Value 
Bronze All individuals and small businesses HSA Level 60% 
Silver All individuals and small businesses HSA Level 70% 
Silver Incomes 300 – 400% FPL 2/3 HSA Level 70% 
Silver Incomes 250 – 300% FPL 1/2 HSA Level 70% 
Silver Incomes 200 – 250% FPL 1/2 HSA Level 73% 
Gold All individuals and small businesses HSA Level 80% 
Gold Incomes 150-200% FPL 1/3 HSA Level 85% 
Platinum All individuals and small businesses HSA Level 90% 
Platinum Incomes 100 – 150% FPL 1/3 HSA Level 94% 
Table 1: Actuarial Values and Cost-Sharing Subsidies in the ACA from The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation. Focus on Health Reform: What the Actuarial Values in the 
Affordable Care Act Mean. April 2011. 
 
The ACA also provides states with the option to create a “Basic Health Plan” for 
uninsured individuals with family incomes between 133 – 200% FPL, who would 
otherwise receive premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies through the exchange.  
Basic Health Plans must offer the essential benefits package and may not impose greater 
cost-sharing than a plan that would have included the credits and subsidies for that level 
of income. 
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Consumer Operated and Oriented Plans 
Section 1322 of the ACA creates the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-
OP) program to “foster the creation of qualified nonprofit health insurance issuers to 
offer qualified health plans in the individual and small group markets in the States in 
which the issuers are licensed to offer such plans” (Public Law 111-148).  In order to 
receive federal grants and loans, these member-run CO-OPs must not be an existing 
health insurer and must fulfill several requirements such as being independent from the 
state or local governments, be held responsible to a majority vote of its members and use 
its profits to lower premiums.  As of March 29, 2012, a total of 10 non-profits offering 
coverage in 10 states have been awarded $845,012,408 in low-interest loans (New Loan 
Program Helps Create Customer-Driven Non-profit Health Insurers 2012). 
 
Risk-Rating and Risk-Adjustment  
Modified community rating of plans is allowed in the ACA but only on the basis 
of age (limited to a 3 to 1 ratio), geographical area, family composition and tobacco use 
(limited to a 1.5 to 1 ratio) (Summary of New Health Reform Law 2011, 5).  This means 
that insurers may increase premiums for older enrollees, but by no more than three times 
the amount they charge the youngest enrollees.  Similarly, insurers may increase 
premiums for smokers to up to150% those of non-smokers.   
Sections 1341 – 1343 outline the basic requirements for the implementation of the 
reinsurance program, risk-corridors and a risk-adjustment program.  The goal of these 
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regulations is to better spread financial risk between insurers to mitigate incentives to 
select healthier individuals.  These programs are applied to all insurers in the relevant 
markets and attempt to limit each insurer’s losses from insuring high-risk individuals and 
gains from insuring lower-risk individuals.  Final rules released by HHS in March 2012 
provide states with substantial guidance for establishing these programs by January 1, 
2014.  The reinsurance program is intended to operate between 2014 and 2016, although 
it may continue operating thereafter if available funds remain.  Similar to existing 
reinsurance, the ACA reinsurance program is an insurance policy for insurers in 
individual markets inside and outside the exchange to protect them from specific-high 
cost individuals.  States have the option to establish their own reinsurance program. 
Otherwise, HHS will administer reinsurance, even if the state is operating its exchange.  
The program will collect contributions from all insurers on a per capita basis.  States have 
the option to collect contributions from self-insured plans, large group health plans and 
fully insured plans.  Insurers providing non-grandfathered individual policies inside and 
outside of the exchange will receive reinsurance recoveries for claims paid on behalf of 
high-risk individuals for any service covered by the plan, even if these are beyond the 
essential health benefits. 
The risk corridors will be administered by HHS between 2014 and 2016 and 
apply to all qualified health plans offered through the exchange, and may include 
qualified health plans offered outside the exchange if these are substantially similar.  The 
risk corridor program will apply at the benefit plan level, and attempt to limit insurers’ 
gains or losses through the exchange within a certain range or “corridor” (Winkelman et. 
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al. 2012, 2).  Through the program, the benefit costs (not including administrative costs) 
will be compared to a “target amount” of the earned premiums (also excluding 
administrative costs) for a plan year.  The costs must fall within a 3% range above or 
below the target amount.  If plans pay over 103% of the target amount, HHS pays plans 
for the additional claims.  Conversely, if a plan pays under 97% of the target amount in 
claims, the plan pays HHS the difference (Merlis, 2011). 
States have the option to administer their own risk adjustment programs if they 
have established an approved exchange, or allow HHS to administer the program.  The 
ACA also allows states to develop their own methodology for calculating the transferred 
payments, although HHS will publish their official methodology, which states may adopt.  
The risk adjustment program will apply to all non-grandfathered in plans in the individual 
and small-group markets.  Following a methodology based on a plan’s average risk score 
across all enrollees, risk adjustment programs will make transfers from plans with 
relatively low-risk populations to plans with relatively high-risk populations.  Successful 
risk adjustment programs will be able to mitigate risk selection by ensuring that plans’ 
are adequately compensated relative to the “riskiness” of their enrollees.  Unlike 
reinsurance and the risk corridors, the risk adjustment program is not a temporary 
program, but is intended to operate in conjunction with the exchanges to mitigate adverse 
selection and ensure the financial viability of the exchange and individual and small-
group markets. 
The reinsurance, risk corridors and risk adjustment programs established in the 
ACA must account for new medical loss ratio requirements.  The medical loss ratio is 
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generally calculated as the ratio of claims expenditures to a plan’s earned premiums.  
Thus, higher medical loss ratios demonstrate that a higher portion of premiums paid by 
enrollees are being use to fund their care.  Conversely, lower medical loss ratios can 
indicate high administrative costs or profits which the insurer is not using to fund health 
care for its enrollees.  States currently have a range of medical loss ratio requirements 
imposed on health insurance markets.  The ACA would change the traditional calculation 
to add quality improvement expenses in the claims expenditures in the numerator and 
remove taxes, licensing and regulatory fees from the earned premiums in the 
denominator.8  Insurers with the highest number of enrollees must meet minimum 
medical loss ratios of 80% for the individual and small group markets and 85% for the 
large group market.  Insurers with fewer enrollees are allowed lower medical loss ratios 
and those with the smallest number of enrollees (less than 1,000 life years) are presumed 
to meet the ACA medical loss requirements (Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical 
Loss Ratio (MLR) 2012, 3).  These requirements are intended to limit excessive profits 
for insurers and incentivize administrative efficiency while acknowledging limitations to 
small insurers who would otherwise be at a disadvantage in lowering their overhead 
costs. 
 
Economic Benefits and Potential Problems for Health Insurance Exchanges 
State health insurance exchanges, combined with reforms in the ACA, are 
intended to change the “rules of the game” which have prevented a portion of the 
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population from accessing affordable health insurance and obtaining necessary health 
care.  Or, as Nichols states, “enable all Americans to have access to the same economies 
of scale, product choice, and risk pooling that workers in large firms have” (Nichols 
2010, 1154).  The overall success of the exchanges in improving access and lowering 
costs will depend on a variety of factors.  The individual mandate, which is currently 
being debated by the U.S. Supreme Court, and public subsidies, will have the greatest 
effect on access to insurance, as well as the average cost of insurance for enrollees.  
Specific state design choices, between an “active purchaser” and a “clearinghouse,” 
separating or merging the individual and small group exchanges, and the size of small 
businesses allowed to participate, will influence premiums, costs and access.  Exchanges’ 
success in risk pooling and managing risk between insurers will determine whether they 
can substantially mitigate adverse selection to improve the insurance environment for 
individuals and small groups.  Finally, exchanges must operate efficiently in carrying out 
the substantial administrative tasks designated to them by the ACA and ensure that they 
are providing value to their enrollees.   
 
Individual Mandate and Public Subsidies 
In March 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments for a lawsuit put forth 
by the State of Florida, and supported by 25 states, disputing the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate (as well as Medicaid expansions) in the ACA.  The Supreme Court is 
expected to provide its opinion by June 2012.  If the individual mandate is struck down as 
unconstitutional, but deemed “severable” from the remainder of the ACA, it is 
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questionable whether state exchanges will succeed in substantially increasing access to 
health insurance.  The individual mandate will essentially maximize potential enrollment 
in the exchanges and the size of their risk pools.  It will also “do more to reduce adverse 
selection than any of the other strategies” (The New York State Health Policy Research 
Center 2009, 9).  By mandating that everyone purchase insurance, relatively healthier 
individuals with lower costs must enter the market, thereby making the overall insured 
population “healthier” and decreasing the average cost of insuring enrollees.  Most health 
care researchers agree that exchanges have historically attracted less healthy enrollees 
than the market at large (Jost 2012, 270).  Without the individual mandate, it is unlikely 
that currently uninsured and relatively healthier individuals will purchase insurance, 
unless the remaining ACA reforms are able to decrease their premiums substantially.  
The exchanges, and the ACA as a whole, could become less than half as effective at 
decreasing uninsurance without the individual mandate (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 3). 
To make mandated insurance affordable, the ACA also includes substantial 
premium credits, cost-sharing subsidies and out-of-pocket limits for low-income 
individuals, and provides tax credits for small employers.  Medicaid expansions will also 
increase the number of people eligible for public benefits.  As a result, low income 
individuals with family incomes up to 400% FPL, not eligible for Medicaid or CHIP, will 
benefit substantially from the credits and subsidies provided through the exchanges. 
Without this public financing, many of them would remain uninsured.  At the same time, 
individuals with higher incomes who would rather pay a penalty, which is capped at 2.5% 
of household income, may remain uninsured.  Middle-income families above 400% FPL, 
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however, may have difficulty paying for mandated insurance, especially if the exchanges 
are unable to contain premium growth.  This could create perverse incentives for 
individuals and families to remain below the 400% FPL threshold for public financial 
assistance.  In addition, the requirement that employers with 50 or more employees 
provide health insurance to full-time employees to avoid paying a penalty, could also 
steer employers towards converting full-time employees to part-time employees or 
contractors (Richardson 2009, 345 and Tully 2010).  This would benefit employers and 
low-income employees as employers would be exempt from providing health insurance 
benefits, and employees would be more likely to qualify for public credits and subsidies. 
The resulting shift of health care expenditures from private payers to the public 
sector, however, could pose problems for the federal government, which is already facing 
an enormous budget deficit and increased pressure to reduce its spending.  Moreover, 
families benefiting from credits and subsidies will be financially removed from their 
health care costs.  This could lead to additional utilization and greater health care 
expenditures in the system.  Some argue, however, that insensitivity to health care costs 
does not necessarily result in increased utilization as visiting the doctor or going to the 
hospital are not experiences most people would undergo unless necessary. 
 
Exchange Design 
One of the most critical design features of the health insurance exchanges is also one of 
the most politically charged decisions facing states—the level of involvement in selecting 
the plans offered through the exchanges.  States which would like to create an exchange 
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with the potential use its market leverage to bargain with insurers on the basis of prices 
and quality may design them to act as “active purchasers.”  Some of these may also use a 
competitive bidding process to select plans offered through the exchange.  On the other 
hand, states which would like to limit the powers of their exchange and leave plan 
selection to the “modified” insurance market may create a “clearinghouse” which will 
offer any willing qualified plan.  As stated in previous sections, theory and empirical 
evidence suggests that an exchange that enrolls a substantial number of individuals and 
small groups to capture a large share of the market could extract lower premiums from 
insurers.   
Although the creation of an “active purchaser” would likely result in lower 
premiums for enrollees, it is difficult to predict whether, or how, these lower premiums 
will be transferred to providers.  If insurers must lower their premiums, they may attempt 
to transfer the loss in premiums to providers by lowering their compensation, or 
attempting to control utilization, which could negatively impact the provision and the 
quality of health care.  The provision and quality of health care from providers may not 
be negatively impacted if the decrease in their compensation does not go below their 
costs.  Thus, the ability of active purchasers to decrease premiums without adverse 
effects on other actors in their supply-chain will depend on whether insurers and 
providers (and other health care products or equipment providers) have excess profits.  If 
this is the case, exchanges could exercise their market power to transfer these profits to 
consumers through lower prices.  If states design exchanges to function as 
clearinghouses, the ACA’s new regulations may still foster sufficient competition among 
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insurers to benefit enrollees.  Exchanges will offer enrollees more plan choices and 
provide standardized, understandable information on offered plans which will facilitate 
comparison shopping. 
 Plan choices and premiums will also depend on whether states decide to maintain 
separate individual and group exchanges (and risk pools) or merge these to provide plans 
through one exchange with one risk pool.  Maintaining separate exchanges and separate 
risk pools would maintain the difference in premiums between the two markets.  The 
level of premiums in this scenario is dependent on the exchanges’ ability to increase its 
enrollment to healthier consumers.  Simply merging the pools, in conjunction with the 
ACA’s other insurance reforms like modified community rating and guarantee issue, 
however, will likely decrease average premiums in the individual market significantly.  
Since the individual market generally suffers from adverse selection and attracts the most 
medically-needy and high-cost individuals, premiums tend to be higher in this market 
compared to other markets, including the small group market.  Thus, merging the two 
markets and limiting experience rating of premiums would decrease the average premium 
for the high-cost individuals in the market.  It is unclear whether premiums will fall 
substantially for small groups, and the larger of these may actually see their premiums 
rise, although by less than the premium decreases for individuals (Lischko and 
Manzolillo 2010, 3). 
Allowing small businesses with up to 100 employees, rather than just those with 
up to 50 employees, to provide insurance through the exchange would also increase the 
size of the exchange’s risk pool.  This could potentially decrease average premiums if the 
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additional businesses include relatively healthier employees.  Allowing more enrollees 
would also make exchanges more attractive for health insurers and provide “active 
purchaser” exchanges additional bargaining power if they are able to capture a larger 
share of the market.   
 
Risk Management 
The ACA provides three main mechanisms for exchanges and the federal 
government to manage risk among insurers.  Since the federally-run risk corridor and the 
reinsurance programs are temporary, the risk adjustment program will become the main 
mechanism for states to mitigate adverse selection.  The ACA allows states to include all 
individual and small group plans offered within and outside of the exchange in their risk 
adjustment program, but excludes self-insured plans and plans grandfathered into the new 
system.  Most grandfathered plans will be offered by large employers, while a smaller 
portion will be provided through the small group market.   
Risk adjustment programs will compensate plans with disproportionately sicker 
enrollees while preventing plans with disproportionately healthier enrollees from reaping 
excessive benefits, thereby minimizing incentives for risk selection by plans.  Risk 
adjustment programs will also have to mitigate any “sliced” risk selection arising if 
relatively healthier enrollees gravitate towards less expensive plans (i.e., Catastrophic 
Plans, or Bronze or Silver Plans) (Jost 2012, 270).   Successful risk adjustment programs 
will stabilize average premiums at a lower rate than what is available currently in the 
individual and small group markets.  Requirements that the insurers charge the same 
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premiums for the same plans inside and outside the exchange and the uniform application 
of insurance regulations will also mitigate adverse selection.  The exclusion of 
grandfathered-in plans and self-insured plans from risk adjustment programs, as well as 
several new ACA regulations may provide incentives for small businesses to self-insure.  
Since it is less expensive for businesses with relatively healthier employees to self-insure 
compared to businesses with relatively sicker employees, there is still potential for 
adverse selection. 
 
Operations and Administration 
Health insurance exchanges will be required to perform a variety of tasks ranging 
from information collection and dissemination, to enrollment in the exchange, Medicaid 
and CHIP, to the administration of subsidies, to premiums collections for small groups.   
Thus, while exchanges will assume many administrative functions for individuals and 
small groups with the potential for economies of scale, they will also be incurring costs of 
their own.  The magnitude of the services exchanges must provide could result in an 
extremely large organization with increased opportunities for waste and unnecessary 
bureaucracy.  States or their non-profit designees will be challenged to create systems to 
operate their exchanges efficiently and smoothly.  Most exchanges are expecting to begin 
charging fees in 2015 when they will no longer receive federal funding for their 
operations and must become self-sustaining.  Since the federal and state governments are 
unlikely to decide to charge fees to enrollees, they will probably charge fees to insurers to 
participate in the exchanges.  In turn, insurers may pass these fees along to enrollees 
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through premiums.  Thus, exchanges must ensure that they provide valuable services to 
their enrollees.  While individuals will easily benefit from using exchanges, small 
businesses, which have the option to self-insure and avoid tedious regulations, must 
receive substantial value from the exchanges to compensate for the additional 
administrative burden of complying with exchange regulations and the potential passing 
along of the exchanges’ administrative fees.  States must make sure to avoid 
diseconomies of small scale which have plagued smaller insurers and contributed to 
insurance industry consolidation.  The ACA does provide states the option of creating 
regional exchanges that could substantially mitigate potential diseconomies of small 
scale.  Regional exchanges would have the ability to enroll a greater number of 
individuals and small groups, thereby allowing them to lower their average administrative 
or overhead costs per enrollee compared to a single state exchange. 
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IMPLEMENTATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 
 
Anticipated Outcomes 
In projecting the effects of the ACA reforms, particularly the health insurance 
exchanges, many researchers have focused on microsimulation models.  Through these 
models they simulate the behavior of various agents (i.e., businesses and families) in 
response to the ACA to project the potential outcomes of the reform.  As described 
above, the ACA gives states a great deal of flexibility in the implementation of their 
exchange.  It is impractical to study the effectiveness of state exchanges outside of the 
context of the other ACA reforms and most researchers examine the ACA as a whole.  
Thus, models also account for the other ACA reforms that support the functions of the 
exchange.  In this section, several of these models will be examined to compare three 
different scenarios representing possible variations in state exchanges.  First, models 
simulating the implementation of existing ACA reforms will be examined to determine 
whether the legislation may achieve its intended goal.  Second, models simulating 
implementation of the ACA reforms without the individual mandate will be examined 
since the U.S. Supreme court may still strike that part of the ACA.  A third scenario, 
involving the implementation of a single-payer system, which at least one state is 
planning on implementing, will also be examined as a point of comparison.  All of the 
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models focus on nonelderly populations and exclude the Medicare-eligible populations 
over 64 years of age from their analyses. 
 
Implementing the Existing ACA Reform 
Eibner et al. of the RAND Corporation use a microsimulation developed at 
RAND, the Comprehensive Assessment of Reform Efforts (COMPARE) model to 
simulate health insurance coverage and health care costs for businesses offering 
insurance inside and outside the exchange.  They run multiple simulations varying 
different assumptions reflecting states’ design differences to estimate their potential 
effects.  They use data from a variety of sources to piece together a synthetic population 
reflecting the characteristics of the national population and businesses.  These data 
include, the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the Household Component (MEPS-HC) from 
2002 and 2003, the 2006 Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational 
Trust Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey (Kaiser/HRET).  All data was modified 
to reflect projected population characteristics for 2010 and 2019.  Due to sample-size 
limitations, Eibner et al. modeled one national exchange, rather than individual state 
exchanges.  Thus, the results of their simulations will be more indicative of outcomes in 
large states with characteristics similar to the nation as a whole, than in small states with 
unique characteristics. 
The COMPARE model uses utility maximization functions to simulate 
individuals’ and businesses’ decisions.  Individuals’ behavior is determined by their 
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eligibility for the expanded Medicaid program and the utility associated with being 
uninsured and obtaining different types of insurance (a standardized employer-sponsored 
plan and each of the plan tiers offered through the exchange).  Individuals’ utility is a 
function of their out-of-pocket health expenditures, premiums, their level of risk aversion 
and the utility associated with consuming health care services.  Firm behavior is modeled 
using a utility function based on aggregate worker utility, the weight firms place that 
utility and the cost of offering insurance.  The model assumes that firms that do not offer 
insurance will pass a fraction of the costs of insurance back to their employees through 
higher wages and that some employees may prefer higher wages rather than employer-
sponsored insurance.   If a large number of employees qualify for Medicaid or premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies through the exchange, employers may decide against offering 
insurance.  The model produces price elasticities ranging from -.54 for firms with 10 or 
fewer employees to -.07 for firms with more than 100 employees, which are well within 
the range reported in previous studies (Eibner et al. 2010, 13).  According to this model, 
even small firms are not very sensitive to price as their demand is relatively inelastic.   
Eibner et al. include the main provisions of the ACA in their model.  However, 
they make some assumptions that other modelers do not.  They do not account for the 
possibility of remaining individual grandfathered in plans and assume the traditional 
individual market for health insurance disappears.  They assume that employer 
contribution rates remain at the current level and allow firms to offer only one plan.  In 
their first simulation, they model the status quo in 2016 by projecting population and 
business characteristics and health care costs and insurance coverage under existing 
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regulations.  In their second simulation, which they call their “baseline” simulation, 
Eibner et al. model an exchange that allows employers with 100 or fewer employees to 
participate, combines the individual and small group markets in the exchange, includes 
the employer and individual mandate penalties but excludes the tax credit for small 
businesses, and assumes exchanges will have administrative costs equaling 12% of plan 
premiums. 
Eibner et al. find that the uninsurance rate would drop from 19% in the status quo 
scenario to 6% in the baseline scenario, with 26% of those insured obtaining coverage 
through the exchange (Eibner et al. 2010, 20).  The share of employers offering health 
insurance would increase from 59% to 81% of all employers so that the percent of 
workers in firms offering insurance would increase from 85% to 95% (Eibner et al. 2010, 
18).  Of workers with health insurance, 75% would be offered traditional employer-
sponsored insurance outside of the exchange.  Although 13% of previously offering firms 
would no longer do so in the baseline model, no firms with over 50 employees would 
drop coverage.  Premiums for employer-sponsored, single coverage would decrease 
slightly in the baseline scenario.  At the same time, the premiums for all plans offered 
through the exchange in the baseline model would be lower than the estimated individual 
premium under the status quo.  The most expensive plan, the Platinum plan, is estimated 
to have an annual premium of $6,000 compared to the status quo estimate of the average 
premium for individual plans of $6,086 (in 2010 dollars) (Eibner et al. 2010, 22).  This 
supports existing theory that merging the individual and small group markets would 
decrease premiums for individuals.  At the same time, the model predicts that the Bronze, 
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Silver and Gold plans in the merged markets would also be cheaper than the estimated 
employer-sponsored plan in the baseline scenario since these have a lower actuarial value 
than the existing employer-sponsored plans (Eibner et al. 2010, 22). 
The COMPARE model also predicts that aggregate employer spending would 
only decrease by 2% from the status quo to the baseline scenario (from $722 billion to 
$705 billion in 2010 dollars) (Eibner et al. 2010, 23).  This is mostly due to firms 
switching to plans with lower actuarial values, although some employers drop insurance 
coverage.  The model also predicts that government spending would increase by $123 
billion per year under the baseline scenario (Eibner et al. 2010, 24).  This accounts for 
premium and cost-sharing subsidies, Medicaid expansions and the individual and 
employer mandate penalties.  This does not take into account new taxes and fees imposed 
on insurers. 
Eibner et al. also model a scenario in which any business may offer insurance 
through the exchange.  In this scenario, total enrollment in the exchange more than 
doubles, and the number enrolled through their employer in the exchange almost triples.  
At the same time, employers offer more lower-actuarial value plans, making Medicaid 
more attractive to eligible workers and decreasing aggregate employer expenditures to 
$608 billion (in 2010 dollars) (Eibner et al. 2010, 29).  This could be indicative of an 
increase the number of underinsured persons since the lower-actuarial value plans may 
not offer sufficient coverage for some individuals.   
In another scenario, Eibner et al. model the effects of separate individual and 
small group risk pools in the exchange.  This model predicts that insurance coverage 
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would shift from the individual market in the exchange to small group coverage in the 
exchange yet not alter the total number of insured.  Since people enrolled in exchanges as 
individuals tend to be less healthy than those whose employers offer insurance through 
the exchange, the premiums for the individuals are about 40% higher than those in the 
small group market under this scenario.  The number of insured persons remains the same 
despite the rise in individual market premiums because government subsidies would limit 
the portion of increased costs passed on to individuals.  Thus, government spending 
under this scenario would increase by $10 billion due to increased subsidies (Eibner et al. 
2010, 31).   
Eibner et al. model additional scenarios that have a minimal effect of the overall 
outcomes the ACA.  The employer penalties and small employer tax credits do not 
significantly increase the number of people insured since employers already have high 
offer rates under the baseline simulation.  This suggests that employers value their 
employees’ preferences above the costs of offering insurance.  This may be related to the 
existing association between employment and insurance coverage and employers’ desire 
to be seen regarded in a positive light.  Since the model does contain a parameter that 
directly affects the weight employers give to employee preferences, however, this may 
just be the result of the magnitude of that parameter.  Additional simulations model the 
effects of changes in the exchange’s administrative costs to 8% and 18% of premiums.  
The effect on exchange enrollment is relatively small in these simulations, suggesting 
that varying administrative costs within a “reasonable range” does not significantly alter 
the effects of the ACA (Eibner et al. 2010, 30).  Eibner et al. also examine the effect of 
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one final variable, inertia, or “bias toward the status quo in decision making” on 
exchange enrollment.  This variable is difficult to anticipate and quantify since 
preferences towards maintaining the status quo or a dislike of change are not well 
explained in economic theory.  Research suggests, however, that inertia is a common 
phenomenon which would decrease enrollment in exchanges to a level below its potential 
(Eibner et al 2010, 31). 
 Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan of the Urban Institute use a similar model, the 
Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) to simulate the ACA as if fully 
implemented in 2010.  They compare the results of that simulation to a simulation of the 
pre-reform environment.  The HIPSM model uses many data sources, including the 
March 2009 and 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC), the February 2005 CPS Contingent Work and Alternative 
Employment Supplement , 2006-2008 pooled MEPS-HC data sets, the 2010 
Kaiser/HRET and America’s Health Insurance Plan (AHIP) surveys and Congressional 
Budget Office data and National Health Expenditure Accounts.  Similar to Eibner et al., 
Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan use this data to create a synthetic population with current 
U.S. population and business characteristics which they model using one exchange.  They 
also use the Massachusetts Health Insurance Survey to build parameters for individual 
behavioral effects under the individual mandate.  HIPSM uses a utility-based framework 
similar to that of the COMPARE model.  Individuals’ utility depends on disposable 
income, out-of-pocket health care spending, health care spending paid by insurers, the 
government or uncompensated care and level of relative risk aversion.  It also attempts to 
 73 
capture family preferences like aversion to public program participation and 
sociodemographic characteristics (Urban Institute, 6).  Employers’ utility is a function of 
whether they anticipate the employees’ aggregate utility from insurance offers to exceed 
the cost of offering and the number of employees who gain value from being offered 
insurance.  The range of price elasticities of firms is greater in HIPSM than in the 
COMPARE model.  Firms with fewer than 10 employees experience a price elasticity of 
-1.16 while firms with 500 to 1000 employees experience a price elasticity of -.047 
(Urban Institute, 18).  Hence in this model, smaller firms are much more sensitive to 
insurance price increases as a 1% increase in price would result in a proportionately 
larger decrease in demand of 1.16%.  At the same time, large firms are generally 
insensitive to price increases. 
Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan model most of the ACA provisions but make 
some assumptions that are different from other models.  They assume that administrative 
costs are increase to 20%, the ACA limit under the reform yet remain at15% without the 
reform.  They also allow employers with up to 100 employees to participate in the 
exchange, separate the individual and small group risk pools in the exchange and 
maintain the traditional individual market outside of the exchange.  The model also 
simulates behavior under the individual mandate, which is based on the applicable 
financial penalty, additional disutility of non-compliance (resulting from a desire to 
comply with the law or avoid enforcement) and a small spill-over effect that results in 
increase insurance coverage for individuals exempt from the mandate (Urban Institute, 
18). 
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Using HIPSM, Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan find that the uninsurance rate 
decreases from 18.6% to 8.3% with the implementation of the ACA and that 17.8% of 
those insured individuals would obtain coverage through the exchange. 9  The percentage 
of the population covered by employer-sponsored insurance outside of the exchange 
decreases from 56.6% to 48.7% with the reform.  Individual coverage outside of 
exchange drops from 5.5% to 1.2% of population, while coverage through the exchange 
increases to 8.7% (Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 2010, 4).  Although their model does 
maintain an individual market outside of the exchange, Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 
observe that it may be difficult for insurers in this market to differentiate themselves, 
especially since subsidies are only available through the exchange.  If they fail to do so, 
the individual market outside of the exchange may disappear entirely. 
Interestingly, the model predicts that 41% of the individuals who would be 
uninsured without the reform would remain uninsured once the ACA is implemented; 
38% of the remaining uninsured would be eligible for Medicaid or CHIP but not enroll, 
26% would be undocumented immigrants unable to participate in the exchange and not 
subject to the individual mandate, 8% would meet affordability exemption requirements 
and 28% would be subject to the individual mandate, yet refuse to comply or pay the 
penalties (Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 2010, 5).  This suggests that even under the 
best circumstances in which exchanges function optimally and the ACA’s other 
regulations are well implemented, a number of people would remain uninsured 
voluntarily or remain excluded from the system. 
                                                 
9
 Calculations based on simulation results in Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan’s “America Under the 
Affordable Care Act,” Table 1: Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of the Nonelderly in Baseline and 
Reform. 
 75 
Under the ACA reforms, Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan estimate that 
government spending would increase by $69 billion if the ACA were fully implemented 
in 2010 (Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 2010, 6).  This accounts for premiums and cost-
sharing subsidies, employer subsidies and individual and employer mandate penalties.  
This does not take into account additional revenues from new taxes and fees or any 
savings from Medicare or Medicaid reforms and cost-control provisions.  The net effect 
of the reform on aggregate employer spending is less than 1%.  Aggregate individual 
spending would increase due to an increase in insurance coverage and individual mandate 
penalties.  While spending for individuals with family incomes below 200% FPL would 
decrease by 12.5% due to public subsidies, spending for those between 200 and 399% 
FPL would increase by 12.5% and spending for at or over 400% FPL would increase by 
16.3% (Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 2010, 6).   
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has modeled the effects of the ACA 
multiple times since the legislation was introduced and has recently updated these 
estimates.  The CBO’s Health Insurance Simulation Model (HISM) works similarly to 
the COMPARE model and HIPSM to project individual and business behaviors of a 
synthetic population mirroring the U.S. population.  The CBO uses data from the May 
2002 SIPP, the 2004 Medicaid Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance Component (MEPS-
IC), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) National Compensation Survey, the 2000 
National Health Expenditure Accounts, the Actuarial Research Corporation, and the 
National Bureau of Economic Research’s tax simulation model, TAXISM.  Unlike the 
COMPARE model and HIPSM, HISM uses an elasticity-based approach to estimate 
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behavioral changes based on past experience and computes premiums exogenously based 
on certain factors (age and sex, health status, the prior year’s spending, geographic 
variation and a base used to convert the previous factors into dollars) (Congressional 
Budget Office 2007, 8).  Firms’ expenditures are estimated based on employees’ 
spending and modified to account for premium loading costs, state premium regulations 
and the relative value of plans.  The model allows employer contributions to vary based 
on firm-level data.  The CBO’s model assumes that the ACA will be fully implemented 
in 2016.   
Based on existing literature, the average elasticity of relative plan value for 
individuals is -.35% which is considered to be relatively inelastic (Congressional Budget 
Office 2007, 16).  The model modifies this elasticity so that individuals with lower 
incomes will have larger elasticities than those with higher incomes.  The price elasticity 
for employers of offering insurance in this model is similar to the elasticities in the 
HIPSM model.  They range from -1.14 for businesses with fewer than 25 employees to 0 
for businesses with over 1000 employees (Congressional Budget Office 2007, 18).  
Specific assumptions used in the CBO’s model such as the size of firms allowed to 
participate in the exchange, or whether the small group and individual risk pools are 
combined are not made explicit in the CBO’s public documents. Since the CBO’s 
estimates are often used as a benchmark for other models of legislation, some of the main 
results are included in this section. 
The CBO’s estimates also provide a different perspective compared to the other 
models discussed because they focus on cumulative effects over ten years, and the 
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projected impact on the federal budget.  In January 2011, they estimated that the reform 
would decrease the federal deficit by $210 billion over 2012-2021 (Elmendorf 2011, 3).  
This includes projected increases in federal spending due to Medicaid expansions, 
premium and cost-sharing subsidies, small business tax credits and administrative costs to 
federal agencies.  The projection also includes sources of decreased federal spending 
such as provisions directed at reducing costs in federal programs, and sources of 
increased federal revenues from mandate penalties and new taxes and fees.  In March 
2012, the CBO and Joint Committee on Taxation (JTC) released “Updated Estimates for 
the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act.”  Their estimates build on 
their March 2011 estimates and incorporate new legislation, a more conservative 
economic forecast and updated projections of health insurance premiums.  They estimate 
that the net cost of the insurance provisions of the ACA would be just under $1.1 trillion 
over 2012-2021, which is $50 billion lower than their previous estimates (Congressional 
Budget Office 2012, 1).  They project that the uninsurance rate in 2016 would be 9% with 
the implementation of the ACA and 20% without the reform.  At the same time the 
percentage of the population with employer-offered insurance would drop by 2%, while 
exchanges would cover 7% of the population.  At the same time, Medicaid and CHIP 
enrollment would increase from 12% to 18% of the population. 10 
Although the specifications of the RAND, Urban Institute and CBO models 
differ, they arrive at similar results which agree with theoretical predictions.  They all 
estimate that the uninsurance rate would decrease by almost half with the implementation 
                                                 
10
 Calculations based on CBO’s data in its March 2012 “Updated Estimates for the Insurance Coverage 
Provisions of the Affordable Care Act,” Table 3. 
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of existing ACA reforms, to levels between 8% and 11% of the population.  Although 
this is a significant decrease in uninsurance, there are still a number of people uninsured.  
Almost a third of those uninsured are undocumented immigrants who cannot participate 
in the exchanges.  Many argue that undocumented immigrants should be allowed to 
participate, and doing so would increase the potential population enrolled in exchanges.  
According to Buettgens, Garrett and Holahan, two thirds of the individuals still uninsured 
after the implementation of ACA would be eligible for Medicaid or CHIP or subject to 
the individual mandate.  At the same time, Eibner et al. discuss the possibility that 
businesses and individuals may not take advantage of ACA regulations due to a 
preference for the status quo or an aversion to change (or the ACA itself).  As a matter of 
fact, the CBO’s March 2012 estimates of the impact of the ACA included a decrease in 
expenditures for small business tax credits to account for lower than anticipated 
preliminary tax data (Congressional Budget Office 2012, 8).  Both of these factors are 
difficult to predict and measure, but could substantially decrease the benefits of state 
exchanges and the ACA and increase the potential for adverse selection, especially in 
smaller states.  These models also demonstrate that enrollment and premiums in state 
health exchanges could vary substantially based on their design choices.  In particular, 
the decision to combine or maintain separate individual and small group markets in the 
exchange could result in great variation.  It is interesting to note that none of these 
models examine states’ choice to design their exchange as an active purchaser or 
clearinghouse.  This may be due to the difficulties in modeling bargaining power in 
concentrated markets that is discussed in prior sections. 
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Eliminating the Individual Mandate 
One of the most, if not the single most, controversial provision in the ACA is the 
individual mandate.  This provision requires almost all legal residents of the U.S. to 
purchase a minimum health insurance package or face financial penalties.  Theoretical 
discussions in previous sections of this paper indicate that this provision could be a 
determining factor in the overall success of health exchanges and the ACA as a whole.  
There is a possibility that the Supreme Court may decide to strike the individual mandate 
provision in the ACA.  If this is the case, they will also decide whether the provision is 
essential for the remaining reforms’ success or if it can be severed from them.  Many 
researchers have attempted to answer this question by simulating what would happen if 
the ACA were implemented without the individual mandate.  Some of those analyses are 
discussed in this section, including some using the models discussed in the previous 
section, as well as an additional model by Jonathan Gruber. 
 Eibner and Price of the Rand Corporation examine the effects of the ACA with 
and without an individual mandate.  The use the COMPARE model described earlier to 
complete this analysis of the projected effects in 2016, when they assume the ACA will 
be fully implemented. They maintain separate small business and individual risk pools 
for the exchange and only model a market for large, grandfathered in plans outside of the 
exchange.  They model a first scenario estimating the effect of the individual mandate by 
increasing the cost (or disutility) of uninsurance by the penalty amount.  In a second 
model, they project the effects of the ACA without an individual mandate.  They find that 
the uninsurance rate under the ACA would increase from 8.8% to 13.4% of the 
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population without the mandate.11  Although the provision of insurance through all 
sources would decrease (i.e., Medicaid, Exchanges, employer-sponsored, etc.), the 
majority of the decrease would occur in the exchange.  This is not unreasonable since the 
majority of increases in enrollment under the current ACA legislation would occur in the 
exchange as this would be the main option for coverage for the previously uninsured who 
do not qualify for Medicaid or CHIP.   
The COMPARE model used by Eibner and Price predicts that the average 
premiums for individual exchange plans without the individual mandate would rise by 
approximately 9.3% (Eibner and Price 2012, 6).  Eibner and Price, however, estimate that 
the majority of this increase is due to variation in age composition of enrollees due to the 
elimination of the individual mandate.  Without the individual mandate, fewer relatively 
healthy enrollees would purchase coverage under the ACA’s modified community rating, 
so the remaining enrollees would be relatively less healthy.  When the premiums without 
the individual mandate are adjusted for age, the average premiums increase by only 2.4% 
(Eibner and Price 2012, 7).  Although this increase is statistically significant, Eibner and 
Price believe its effect would be relatively small (about $140 annual increase for the 
individual silver plan) (Eibner and Price 2012, 7).  Eibner and Price conclude that, due to 
other ACA reforms, particularly premium and cost-sharing subsidies, eliminating the 
individual mandate would not necessarily lead to an adverse selection problem that would 
destabilize exchanges.   
                                                 
11
 Calculations based on date in Eibner and Price’s 2012 “The Effect of the Affordable Care Act on 
Enrollment and Premiums, With and Without the Individual Mandate,” Tables 1 and 2. 
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Their conclusion may be the result of maintaining separate individual and small 
group markets in the exchange.  This allows insurers to charge different premiums for 
each market that reflect the relative differences in each populations’ health (individual 
market enrollees are generally relatively less healthy than small group market enrollees).  
Since enrollment in the individual market would decrease much more than enrollment in 
the small group market in the absence of the individual mandate, premiums in the 
individual market are also affected more than premiums in the small group market. If the 
two markets were combined, however, the decreased enrollment of relatively healthier 
individuals would affect individual as well as small group premiums in the merged 
market.  To the extent that price-sensitive small groups would exit the exchange as a 
result of the premiums increase, premiums would increase further, leading to additional 
individuals and small businesses leaving the exchange. 
Although Eibner and Price project that eliminating the individual mandate would 
have a relatively small effect on individual market premiums, this is mostly at the 
expense of the federal government.  Since the individual mandate does not affect the 
provision of premium and cost-sharing subsidies, the number of individuals eligible for 
these subsidies would remain the same under both scenarios.  As premiums rise due to 
the lower enrollment of relatively healthier individuals without the individual mandate, 
the amount the federal government must provide in the form of subsidies increases.  
Eibner and Price estimate that new government spending per newly insured individual 
would more than double from $3,659 to $7,468 (Eibner and Price 2012, 8).  Due to the 
lower number of newly insured without the individual mandate, total government 
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spending would only rise by around 2.5% and total health spending by all agents would 
decrease by 2.3%.12 
Buettgens and Carroll use the Urban Institute’s HIPSM to examine the effect of 
eliminating the individual mandate from the ACA as if the reform were fully 
implemented in 2011.  They model four different scenarios: 1) the current ACA reform 
with the individual mandate; 2) the ACA without the individual mandate but with robust 
exchange enrollment; 3) the ACA without the mandate with lower preference for 
exchange coverage; and 4) the previous scenario with lower subsidy take-up rates.  The 
different scenarios in Buettgens and Carroll’s analysis represent a range of behaviors in 
response to the ACA which are difficult to predict and quantify, yet could have a large 
impact on the results of the ACA.  The second scenario represents the optimal outcome 
without the individual mandate, while the third and fourth scenarios represent possible 
shortcomings of the exchanges (in terms of marketing or the web interface, etc.) 
(Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 2).  In this model, Buettgens and Carroll maintain separate 
individual and small group markets (since a majority of states have kept them separate) 
and account for anticipated guidance from HHS regarding the affordability exception to 
the individual mandate.  The latter had the effect of increasing the number of uninsured 
relative to the previously cited iteration of HIPSM.   
Without the individual mandate, Buettgens and Carroll estimate that the 
uninsurance rate would increase from 9.8% to 14.8%, even with robust exchange 
enrollment (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 3).  Thus, without the individual mandate, the 
                                                 
12
 Calculations based on date in Eibner and Price’s 2012 “The Effect of the Affordable Care Act on 
Enrollment and Premiums, With and Without the Individual Mandate,” Tables 5 and 6. 
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ACA would be less than half as effective at decreasing uninsurance, even in the best case 
scenario (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 3).   The additional impact of ineffective outreach, 
low exchange preference and low subsidy take-up is relatively small.  In the fourth 
scenario, for example, the uninsurance rate increases to only 15.7% (Buettgens and 
Carroll 2012, 3).  Similar to Eibner and Price’s simulation, Buettgens and Carroll find 
that insurance coverage through all sources decreases.  Compared to the ACA with the 
individual mandate, the percentage of the population enrolled in the exchange decreases 
by 2% without the mandate and by 5.9% in the fourth scenario with the lowest exchange 
enrollment (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 3).  The decrease in exchange enrollment in the 
latter scenario is partially mitigated by increased coverage through employers and the 
individual market outside of the exchange. 
Buettgens and Carroll estimate that premiums inside and outside the exchange 
would be different.  Due to ACA regulations for plans offered through the exchange, 
Buettgens and Carroll must be assuming that different plans would be offered outside the 
exchange.  In this case, they believe that most of the individuals already purchasing 
insurance through the traditional individual market that are ineligible for subsidies would 
remain outside the exchange.  Buettgens and Carroll also assume that these individuals 
would be relatively healthier than the new exchange enrollees, making premiums inside 
the exchange 6.1% higher than those outside the exchange with the individual mandate 
(Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 6).  When the individual mandate is removed but exchange 
enrollment is robust, premiums inside the exchange would increase by 10% while 
premiums outside the exchange would only increase by 4%.  If the individual mandate is 
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removed and individuals and businesses have a lower exchange preference and low 
subsidy take-up, premiums inside the exchange would rise by 25% (and 14% outside the 
exchange) (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 6).  Since initial exchange enrollment may grow 
slowly, it may actually resemble Buettgens and Carroll’s third and fourth scenarios.  
Given the results of these scenarios, it is not difficult to imagine that exchanges would 
suffer from adverse selection in the absence of the individual mandate 
Buettgens and Carroll also estimate the effects of the ACA with and without the 
individual mandate on government spending.  With the individual mandate, the ACA 
would decrease the level of uninsurance by 48% relative to current conditions, while 
government spending would increase by 34% (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 5).  Without 
the individual mandate the level of uninsurance would decrease by only 21% relative to 
current conditions, while government spending would increase by 30% (Buettgens and 
Carroll 2012, 5).  Thus, while eliminating the individual mandate would cut the ACA’s 
effect on uninsurance by more than 50%, the level of government spending would only 
decrease by 3% to 8%.  With the individual mandate, increased government spending is 
more effective and affects a larger number of people. 
The CBO has also presented brief results from modeling the effects of 
implementing the ACA without the individual mandate using HISM for the 2011-2012 
period.  The CBO estimates that the modified reform would reduce the federal budget 
deficit by $252 billion (Congressional Budget Office 2010, 1).  This is slightly more than 
the CBO estimate for the 2012-2021 period of $210 with the current ACA regulations.  
The CBO estimates that eliminating the individual mandate would almost double the 
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number of uninsured under the ACA (Congressional Budget Office 2010, 2).  Without 
the individual mandate, the CBO estimates that insurance coverage among relatively 
healthier people would experience a greater decrease than insurance coverage among 
relatively less healthy people.  Thus, the average enrollee would be less healthy, leading 
to adverse selection.  The CBO estimates a significant amount of adverse selection which 
would increase premiums in the individual markets (inside and outside the exchange) by 
15% to 20% (Congressional Budget Office 2010, 2).   
  Another influential health care researcher, Jonathan Gruber, estimates the effects 
of the ACA without the individual mandate using the Gruber Microsimulation Model, 
GMSIM.  The model relies on multiple data sources to create a synthetic population 
representative of the U.S. national population.  The data sources include, the 2005 CPS, 
MEPS-IC, state regulatory data, TAXISM, BLS data on firms and wages and data on 
undocumented immigrants from the Pew Hispanic Center.  The GMSIM determines 
policy outcomes by simulating the behaviors of firms, which then impact individual 
behaviors.  As a final step, regulatory actions are then applied after voluntary behaviors 
have been modeled.  Similar to the CBO’s HISM, the GMSIM estimates individuals’ 
health care costs using their age, sex and health rating.  Firms’ decisions are dependent 
on elasticities which are based on empirical literature.  Firms’ elasticity of providing 
insurance with respect to the net income tax subsidy to the firms’ employees plays a 
central role in their decision to offer insurance.  These range from -.96 for firms with less 
than 200 employees to -.1 for firms with more than 1000 employees (Gruber, 9).  A 
firm’s decision to offer insurance is a function of the firm’s elasticity of providing 
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insurance, in combination with any tax penalties for not offering insurance and expected 
expenditures per worker if offering insurance.  The GMSIM accounts for changes in the 
actuarial value of plans offered, but maintains higher average actuarial values for 
employer-sponsored insurance compared to insurance in the individual markets.   
Individuals’ decisions to purchase offered insurance is dependent on a health-
related parameter affecting their health care costs, their elasticity of demand (which 
varies by individual), the percent change in the price due to a policy change and their 
income.  These are then modified to account for other insurance take-up parameters.  
Individuals’ elasticity depends on a variety of factors.  Uninsured individuals, for 
example have an average elasticity of -.5 when facing a 50% reduction in the price of 
insurance in the individual market (Gruber, 18).   Uninsured individuals who are offered 
employer-sponsored insurance have a relatively less elastic demand as they are more 
willing to pay large contributions for the offered insurance.  Similarly, individuals 
already eligible for employer-sponsored insurance also have low price elasticity when 
deciding to reenroll with their employer. 
Gruber uses the GMSIM to estimate the impact of removing the individual 
mandate provision from the ACA in 2019.  Like the CBO models described above, the 
particular design of the exchanges modeled by Gruber are not explicitly stated, such as 
the size employers allowed to participate in the exchange or whether the individual and 
small group market are combined.  Gruber’s model still offers valuable insights as it 
maintains the general provisions of the ACA and undoubtedly represents one of the 
exchanges designed by states.  Gruber estimates that the number of newly insured 
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individuals will decrease by three quarters in the absence of the individual mandate while 
premiums in the individual market increase by 27% (Gruber 2011, 2).  These estimates 
are substantially higher than those of the previous models discussed.  This suggests that 
the parameters of the GMISM model include higher price elasticities for both firms and 
individuals as any initial increase in premiums would result in a larger decrease in 
demand which would further increase premiums due to adverse selection.  Like the other 
models discussed in this section, the GMISM model estimates that eliminating the 
individual mandate would decrease coverage by 50% to 75% while only decreasing 
government spending by 25% to 30% (Gruber 2011, 2). 
It is difficult to believe that the ACA without the individual mandate would be 
“successful.”  Although “success” is a relative term, most researchers agree that the 
effectiveness of the ACA in decreasing uninsurance will be cut by at least half.  Perhaps 
the ACA would then be half as successful.  Moreover, eliminating the individual mandate 
would have other adverse effects like increasing premiums in the individual markets 
while lower new government spending aids a disproportionately smaller number of 
people.  Although the results from the models discussed above vary in magnitude, it 
seems clear that the individual mandate is an essential part of the ACA.  Without the 
individual mandate, the implementation of the remaining ACA reforms must be perfect to 
achieve the results that approach what they would be otherwise.  If people are not 
compelled to purchase insurance by financial penalties, it becomes more important that 
health insurance exchanges perform optimally by educating and enrolling a large number 
of people, especially relatively healthier people, to mitigate adverse selection and create a 
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well-functioning market.  It seems unlikely that the implementation of the exchanges and 
other important reforms such as the risk adjustment program will not encounter any 
obstacles.  Without the individual mandate to act as a safeguard against these obstacles, 
there is more uncertainty regarding the effects of the ACA. 
 
The Single Payer Option 
Although states were given a great deal of flexibility in implementing the health 
insurance exchanges in the ACA, some states have become interested in a more radical 
reform requiring even more flexibility—creating a single payer health care system.  In 
2011, Vermont passed legislation that would establish its state exchange according to the 
ACA, and then transform it into a single payer-system within a few years.   The proposal 
and model that provided the foundation for the Vermont legislation will be examined in 
this section, along with a study prepared by consultants from the Lewin Group for the 
state of Maryland in 2000.  These models not only provide an interesting contrast to the 
previous sections on the ACA with and without the individual mandate, but may become 
important if states like Vermont are able to implement them successfully. 
In response to a study commissioned by the Vermont legislature in 2010, Hsiao, 
Kappel and Gruber recommended a public-private single payer system that they believed 
would drastically improve Vermont’s health care landscape.  The proposed system was 
designed to accomplish six goals: 1) maintain, if not decrease the current level of overall 
health spending; 2) include a minimum benefits package that at least covers the average 
benefits currently enjoyed by Vermont residents; 3) maximize federal revenues; 4) 
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maintain overall net income for Vermont providers; 5) increase the supply of providers 
through “targeted investments”; and 6) implement payment reforms to incentivize the 
provision of high quality care and efficiency and eliminate perverse incentives created by 
fee-for-service arrangements (Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 2010, ix). 
In this single payer system, Medicaid and Medicare benefits would not change, 
but payments for these programs would be made through the same claims administration 
process as for the privately insured.  The standard benefits package provided to everyone 
privately insured would include cost sharing for individuals with family incomes at or 
above 200% FPL.  Payroll contributions towards health insurance costs would be shared 
between employers and employees, but insurance coverage would no longer be offered 
through employers.  The single payer system would reimburse providers through a 
capitation-based payment method.  Many of the Vermont state agencies currently 
performing similar functions would be responsible for determining eligibility for the 
system, collecting payroll contributions, licensing of providers and patient safety 
regulation.  The independent governing Board of the system, however, would represent 
the different actors in the health care system including providers, employers and 
consumers and be responsible for determining the benefits package and payment rates.  
Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber suggest that the Board contract the claims administration 
component to a private company to take advantage of their knowledge and efficiency.  
In order to evaluate the effects of their recommendation, Hsiao, Kappel and 
Gruber first model the impact of the ACA on Vermont and then model the impact of their 
single payer proposal in 2016.  They pool three years of CPS data combined with MEPS-
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IC data to create a synthetic population reflecting Vermont-specific conditions to perform 
their analysis using the GMSIM.  In modeling the ACA, they do not specify the specific 
characteristics of the Vermont exchange such as merging the small group and individual 
markets or the size of employers allowed to participate, but do mention the other main 
ACA provisions.  In modeling their single payer proposal, Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 
assume that the single payer plan covers all Vermont residents who are U.S. citizens or 
documented legal immigrants.  These would be part of a single state-wide risk pool.  
Their model also includes a standard benefit package that excludes long-term care, 
includes limited vision and dental benefits, and requires certain copayments.  They 
exempt both the employee and employer share of payroll contributions for employees 
earning less than 200% FPL (Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 2010, 137).  Hsiao, Kappel and 
Gruber also use the Regional Macroeconomic Model (REMI) to estimate their effects on 
Vermont’s economy.  Due to the scope of this paper, this model is not explained in detail, 
but it attempts to account for additional factors such as investments in primary and 
preventive care education, incentives towards the provision of primary and preventive 
care and towards healthy lifestyle choices. 
Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber estimate that the ACA would decrease the uninsurance 
rate in Vermont by around 40%, leaving approximately 31,000 uninsured in 2016. 13  
Under the single payer system, all legal residents would be automatically enrolled in the 
standard benefits package.  The only remaining uninsured would be undocumented 
immigrants and new Vermont residents who could not yet prove their residency status.  
                                                 
13
 Calculation based on data in Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber’s 2010 “Act 128: Health System Reform Design. 
Achieving Affordable Universal Health Care in Vermont,” page 78. 
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To calculate the impact on total health care spending, they assume that the various 
incentives in the ACA will result in health care payment and delivery reforms.  Those 
reforms, in conjunction with the health insurance exchange and other ACA reforms, 
would actually decrease health expenditures by up to $60 million (Hsiao, Kappel and 
Gruber 2010, 79).  Total health expenditures under their single payer proposal are 
projected to be $770 million lower than expenditures under the ACA, or $5.7 billion 
(Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 2010, 150).   The model also projects that total premiums for 
employer-sponsored insurance, including both the employer and employee shares, would 
reach 13.4% of payroll under the ACA and 12.5% with the single payer proposal (Hsiao, 
Kappel and Gruber 2010, 151).  Under the ACA, the net costs to households with 
incomes over 400% would be $96, much lower than the costs under the single payer 
system of $552 (Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 2010, 82).   
Sheils and Haught model a similar single payer program for the state of Maryland.  
Their plan would cover all legal residents of the state, including those currently covered 
under Medicare, Medicaid, CAMPUS and the FEHB Program (Sheils and Haught 2000, 
2).  Medicaid beneficiaries, however, would retain any benefits not covered under the 
single payer benefits package.  Their single payer program would attempt to control costs 
by using a gatekeeper model of managed care and establish annual global budgets for 
health care services covered through the program.  The program would be financed using 
existing local and federal funding, a payroll tax, increase taxes on tobacco and alcohol, 
and an increase in the state personal income tax (Sheils and Haught 2000, 4).  The 
financial impact of the single payer program on the federal, state and local governments, 
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employers and households is estimated using the Lewin Group Health Benefits 
Simulation Model (HBSM).  The model uses adjusted data from the Maryland subsample 
of the March 1999 CPS, merged with the 1987 National Medical Expenditures Survey 
(NMES) to represent Maryland’s projected population in 2001. Health care expenditure 
data is based on estimates developed by the Maryland Health Services Cost Review 
Commission.    
The HBSM uses this data to estimate impacts on the number of employers, 
businesses and dependents affected, costs to different agents, and health care utilization.  
The largest changes in health care spending would result from increased efficiency in 
administrative functions performed by insurers, physician and hospitals and increased 
utilization due to increase health insurance coverage.  Administrative expenditures in the 
system would decrease by $1,085.4 million, with over half of that amount being savings 
for insurers.  The increase in health care utilization for previously insured and 
underinsured individuals would result in additional $675.9 billion in expenditures (Sheils 
and Haught 2000, 11).   Sheils and Haught estimate the single payer plan would decrease 
the projected total health care expenditures of $20,759 million under current regulations 
by $345.8 million (Sheils and Haught 2000, 9-10).  In their model increases in utilization 
due to increased health insurance coverage are more than offset by reductions in 
administrative costs and payment reforms.  Sheils and Haught estimate that the single 
payer program would result in a decrease in total household spending on health care by 
$161 million, accounting for decreased premiums and out-of-pocket payments as well as 
increase tax payments and lost wages (Sheils and Haught 2000, 31).  These decreases in 
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household spending accrue mostly to families with incomes under $100,000, which is 
above 500% FPL.14 
These simulations agree that the single payer model results in substantial 
administrative efficiencies as payments throughout the health care system are 
standardized and streamlined.  These are assumed to outweigh any additional costs from 
managing the new system.  At the same time, the problem of uninsurance disappears, as 
all legal residents are generally included in the system.  The financing of these systems, 
however, involve substantial cost-shifting between those with higher incomes to those 
with lower incomes.  Similarly, savings or benefits from the system are enjoyed 
disproportionately by those with lower incomes, or the previously uninsured.   This 
subsidization has been a source of philosophical and moral debate in the U.S. Although it 
has historically prevented the implementation of other single payer proposals, the system 
implemented in Vermont could alter these perceptions if it is successful.    
 
Existing and Ongoing Implementation Efforts 
Implementation of the health benefits exchanges outlined in the ACA has varied 
greatly by state.  According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, which has been tracking 
state progress in implementing the ACA reforms, two states, Louisiana and Arkansas, 
have decided against implementing an exchange for their state.  Three other states have 
plans to establish an exchange, 20 are studying their options and 12 have not taken any 
significant actions regarding this aspect of the ACA.  The Kaiser Family Foundation 
                                                 
14
 Calculation based data from Sheils and Haught’s 2000 “Analysis of the Costs and Impact of Universal 
Health Care Models for the State of Maryland: The Single-payer and Multi-payer Models,” page 34, and 
the 2001 HHS Poverty Guidelines, assuming that the average household size is 4 people. 
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categorizes state exchanges based on two criteria: the source of state activity and the 
structure of the exchange.  The source of state activity refers to the type of entity the 
exchange whether it is a non-profit, a quasi-governmental entity or operated by the state.  
The structure of the exchange refers to whether the exchange will operate as an active 
purchaser or a clearing house for any qualified health plan.   Utah and Massachusetts had 
already established an active purchaser and a clearinghouse exchanges, respectively, prior 
to the ACA.  Of the 12 states that have established their state health insurance exchange 
because of ACA, six are active purchasers (Rhode Island, Vermont, California, 
Connecticut, District of Columbia, and Oregon), while two (Hawaii and Colorado) are 
clearinghouses.  Four states (West Virginia, Nevada and Washington) have yet to decide 
whether their exchange will be an active purchaser or act only as a clearinghouse for 
qualified plans.  Most exchanges are quasi-governmental entities or operated by the state.  
Only one exchange, Hawaii’s, is a non-profit entity.  Appendix A contains a short 
summary of the progress of health insurance exchanges established by states as of March 
1, 2012. 
 
Implications for Colorado 
 
Colorado’s Existing Insurance Market 
Colorado’s insurance market mirrors the U.S. as a whole.  Since Colorado has 
fared better than other states during the recent economic recession, however, general 
insurance levels in the state are higher than for the U.S. population.  Compared to the 
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national average for 2010, uninsurance in Colorado was 3% lower, while employment-
based insurance was 3% higher.  At the same time, a larger portion of Colorado’s 
population, almost 13%, was covered by individual health insurance (Division of 
Insurance 2011, 7).  In an initial report for the State of Colorado presenting an analysis of 
the potential impact of its health insurance exchange, Jonathan Gruber draws a useful 
picture of Colorado’s uninsured population.  A significant portion of Colorado’s 
uninsured population is employed, approximately 60%, around two-thirds of which is 
offered and eligible for, employer-sponsored insurance.  Approximately 60% of 
uninsured individuals have family incomes below 200% FPL, supporting the existence of 
a large group of uninsured, working poor.  An estimated 12.5% of Colorado’s uninsured 
population, however, has a family income greater than 400% FPL.  Gruber finds a wide 
age distribution among the uninsured, although the most common age group is 25-34 year 
olds (Gruber 2012, 7). 
Similar to individual markets in other states, Colorado’s individual insurance 
market faces less restrictive regulations than the markets for group plans.  Insurers may 
use experience rating to underwrite health plans.  While Colorado’s Division of Insurance 
does require that plans cover certain basic benefits, these are fewer in number than for 
other markets.  Also, Colorado does not require insurers to sell standardized policies in 
the market.  Colorado does operate subsidized high risk pools with very limited 
enrollment for individuals who would otherwise be denied insurance due to pre-existing 
conditions. In contrast to the individual market, Colorado’s small group market is the 
most heavily regulated market in the state requiring certain benefits, guaranteed 
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renewability and modified community rating (2011 Colorado Health Cost Report 2011, 
12-13). 
Colorado’s insurance markets have also followed the national trend towards 
consolidation among insurers.  In 2007, the AMA found that the two largest insurers in 6 
of the largest Metro areas of Colorado dominated between 50% and 81% of the market 
(Competition in health insurance: A comprehensive study of U.S. markets: 2007 update, 
8).  A report based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau and HHS found that family 
health insurance premiums in the private market rose 4.2 times faster than median 
earnings between 2000 to 2009 (Costly Coverage: Premiums Outpace Paychecks In 
Colorado, 1).  Thus, Colorado has not been immune to the trend towards insurer 
consolidation and health care cost increases that have affected the country as a whole.  
This suggests ample opportunity for ACA reforms and a well-designed exchange to 
improve the health insurance markets in Colorado. 
  
The Colorado Health Benefit Exchange 
Governor John Hickenlooper signed SB 11-200 into law on June 1, 2011, 
establishing the Colorado Health Benefit Exchange as a “nonprofit unincorporated public 
entity” (Colorado Senate 2011, SB 11-200).  The 12-member Board of Directors 
governing the Exchange is responsible for considering and determining the structure of 
the Exchange, but does not have the authority to promulgate rules or perform any of the 
duties of the state’s Insurance Commissioner.  The bipartisan Legislative Health Benefit 
Exchange Implementation Review Committee, however, may offer bills or other 
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recommendations related to planning or establishing the Exchange to the legislative 
council and approve financial and operational plans submitted by the Board.   
Colorado’s exchange is explicitly prohibited from soliciting bids or acting as an 
active purchaser and will thus function as a clearinghouse for all qualified plans offered 
by any insurance carrier authorized to conduct business in the state.  The Exchange will 
maintain separate individual and small-group markets, although these may be combined 
under the Board’s recommendation.  The Exchange Board recently voted to limit the 
small employer exchange to employers with 50 or fewer employees until 2016 when all 
exchanges must accept employers with up to 100 employees (Colorado Health Benefit 
Exchange).  The Colorado Health Benefit Exchange is expected to become operational in 
October 2013. 
 
Impact of Colorado’s Exchange 
Colorado is still at the beginning stages of establishing its Exchange and its Board 
of Directors has many decisions to make.  The initial decision to design the Exchange as 
a clearinghouse for any willing plan, suggests that the Exchange may not be as effective 
in obtaining premium decreases for its enrollees as it could be as an active purchaser.   
Using a variety of data sources, including the Current Population Survey, the Colorado 
Household Survey collected through Colorado’s Department of Health Care Policy and 
Financing and data from the private insurance market, Gruber models the effects of 
Colorado’s Exchange on insurance coverage and premiums in 2016 using the GMSIM 
described in detail in previous sections.    
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Gruber compares the results of his model, which is based on assumptions of how 
the various actors will react to ACA regulations and the Exchange, to a counterfactual 
scenario without the reform.  He estimates that the number of uninsured individuals 
would fall by around 45% with the exchange and finds that the number of enrollees in the 
individual market would grow substantially just after the Exchange’s implementation and 
continue growing afterwards (Gruber 2012, 9).  Gruber’s model also finds that the 
majority of newly insured people would have incomes below 400% FPL (receiving 
premium subsidies), enroll in Medicaid or enroll in insurance through the small group 
exchange because of the small business tax credits.  Meanwhile, the Exchange and ACA 
reforms would actually result in some previously insured individuals losing insurance, 
around 8%, as a result of their employer dropping insurance, or because of premium 
increases in either the individual market or for their employer-sponsored insurance.  This 
suggests that the Exchange will adversely affect a small number of individuals.   
Gruber also models the effect of the Exchange on premiums.  They account for 
the effects of the essential benefits, minimum actuarial value (60%) and minimum loss 
ration requirements, the movement of Colorado’s existing high risk pool to the exchange, 
increased competition among insurers, and the modified community rating requirements.  
They find that average premiums in the individual market would actually rise around 
19%, which may be partially mitigated as they will be around 11% more generous on 
average.  This increase is partly the result of individuals choosing more comprehensive 
health plans which are made more affordable by public credits and subsidies. 
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Despite the average increase in premiums, Gruber estimates that 70% of current 
enrollees in the individual market will benefit from reduced premiums costs, 17% will 
not experience any substantial change to their premiums cost, while 6% will experience a 
rise in premiums costs of less than 10% and 7% will experience a rise of over 10%.  
Overall, the number of people experiencing net benefits from the Exchange and ACA 
regulations is more than three times the number of people experiencing net losses 
(Gruber 2012, 14-15).   Gruber’s analysis and results are logical and consistent with the 
general theory relating to health insurance Exchanges.  Thus, as long as the individual 
mandate provision remains in the ACA, it seems like Colorado’s exchange, despite its 
inability to use its market power to bargain with insurers, will result in social benefits that 
outweigh social losses, although this will be mostly due to public subsidies assuming 
increased costs for many enrollees. 
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CONCLUSION 
The question of whether the Health Insurance Exchanges mandated by the ACA 
are a panacea or a band-aid seems complex, yet after careful examination, the answer is 
simple—they are not.  They are intended to correct the many market failures in health 
insurance markets and in doing so, increase health insurance coverage and mitigate cost 
increases.  Theoretical and empirical evidence, and simulations based on this evidence, 
suggests that exchanges’ ability to correct market failures, especially adverse selection, is 
questionable.  Even in the best case scenario, in which the individual mandate maximizes 
the potential number of exchange enrollees and the exchanges function optimally, 
uninsurance rates are estimated to decrease by just 50%.  Although this is a substantial 
improvement over current conditions, this does not qualify as the result of a “panacea” as 
a number of people will remain uninsured.  If the U.S. Supreme court decides that the 
individual mandate is severable from the rest of the ACA and strikes that provision, the 
reform’s ability to decrease uninsurance rates will be cut in half.  In this environment, it 
is even more important that exchanges perform well and increase their enrollment to 
avoid adverse selection that could render them unsustainable.  The remaining state design 
options affect enrollment and costs, but the effect of the individual mandate (or lack 
thereof) overshadows their effects.   
The effectiveness of exchanges is also limited by provisions in the ACA which 
maintain and even strengthen the connection between employment and insurance 
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coverage like the employer mandate and small business tax credits.  Additionally, large 
employers with over 100 employees are prohibited from offering coverage from 
exchange, and individual and small group markets are allowed to exist outside of the 
exchange in most states.  This substantially reduces the number of potential enrollees in 
the exchanges to less than half the population, which limits the exchanges’ ability to 
increase health care coverage.  The ACA retains the main components of today’s system, 
and only adds the exchanges to cover those who are currently left outside the system, 
which act like a band-aid for them.  Most researchers project that the level of adverse 
selection would increase as the level of exchange enrollment decrease, despite the 
implementation of risk adjustment programs.  Thus, the exchanges’ ability to increase 
coverage is limited to only a portion of those who would otherwise remain uninsured, 
mostly because the ACA fails to give it additional capacity by maintaining existing 
insurance coverage sources.  
An alternate solution that is discussed briefly, a single payer system, completely 
removes the need to consider uninsurance since all legal residents are automatically 
enrolled in the system.  Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that significant 
administrative efficiencies can also be achieved in this type of system.  Increased 
bargaining power would also allow the system to better control costs and implement 
payment reforms.  With this description it would seem like a single payer system would 
be the panacea, yet it is not without its own challenges.  The U.S. population has 
generally opposes this type of system due to a dislike of the high level of subsidization 
from higher income groups to lower income groups, its limited choices for consumers, 
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concerns about possible rationing and a fear of government bureaucracy and the 
expansion of government powers.  Analysis of the single payer system, however, does 
indicate that a “panacea” to cure the ailing U.S. health care system would require more 
radical changes to the systems’ structure, rather than follow the incrementalist approach 
reforms have historically followed that are essentially just another band-aid for the 
system. 
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APPENDIX A: STATES’ PROGRESS ON HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
IMPLEMENTATION  
Health Benefits Exchanges Established Prior to the Affordable Care Act 
Massachusetts 
On April 12, 2006 Governor Mitt Romney signed “An Act Providing Access to 
Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,” a comprehensive reform of the state’s 
health care system.  The legislation included an individual mandate, requirements that 
employers provide a certain level of insurance coverage or face financial penalties, and 
established a health care exchange, the Commonwealth Health Connector Authority (the 
Connector).  The Connector is legally separate from the Commonwealth and is governed 
by an 11-member board, four of which are ex-officio members, representing both private 
and public stakeholders. (Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority Board).  
The Connector is an active purchaser that uses specific criteria to ensure that all plans 
offered receive its “Seal of Approval.”  The Connector offers insurance through two 
programs, Commonwealth Care and Commonwealth Choice.  Commonwealth Care 
offers three tiers of subsidized health insurance for uninsured individuals (they cannot be 
eligible for Medicaid) aged 19 years or older, with family incomes up to 300% FPL.   
Commonwealth Choice offers three types of insurance plans to a wider range of 
consumers, and catastrophic coverage to young adults.  Insurance plans are grouped into 
three tiers based on the level of cost-sharing.  Businesses with up to 50 employees may 
offer insurance through the Commonwealth Choice program.  Since the Massachusetts 
reforms greatly influenced the federal health care reform, it is not surprising that a legal 
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review found that the Connector currently has the authority to perform the functions of a 
health insurance exchange as outlined in the ACA.  Thus, the state is currently working to 
ensure that the Connector and the state’s other health reforms comply with ACA (State 
Exchange Profiles: Massachusetts, uploaded February 22, 2012).   
 
Utah 
Utah passed several pieces of legislation in 2008 and 2009 that organized efforts 
to research health care sector reforms.  These culminated in the creation of the Utah 
Health Exchange, which began operating in 2010.  The Utah Health Exchange is 
administered by the Office of Consumer Health Services, which is part of the Governor’s 
Office of Economic Development.  The existing exchange in Utah acts as an online 
clearinghouse, offering any willing plan to small businesses and their employees (Utah 
Health Exchange Overview).  These small businesses are limited to those with 50 or 
fewer employees, including self-employed individuals and their families.  While 
employers determine the amount they would like to contribute towards their employees’ 
benefits, employees have a wide variety of choices, using the exchange to compare 
various plans and enrolling in their chosen plan electronically.  While Utah’s existing 
exchange provides a solid basis from which to fulfill the ACA requirements regarding 
small-group insurance, it requires significant modifications to fulfill federal regulations 
regarding the individual market.  The Health System Reform Task Force, which 
developed the existing exchange, is currently exploring various options to modify and 
enhance the Utah Health Exchange so that it satisfies regulations in the ACA.   
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Health Benefits Exchanges Established as a Result of the ACA: State Operated 
Active Purchasers 
Rhode Island 
During the 2011 Rhode Island legislative session, a bill was introduced which 
would have established a health benefits exchange.  After the legislature failed to pass 
this bill, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee established the Rhode Island Health 
Benefits Exchange through Executive Order 11-09 on September 19, 2011.  To avoid 
legislative involvement, the Executive Order created the state’s exchange as a division 
within the Executive Department.  The Exchange is governed by a 13-member Board, 
which receives guidance from various workgroups representing industry experts and 
stakeholders (State Exchange Profiles: Rhode Island, uploaded February 17, 2012).    
Although development of the Exchange is still far from completed, the Rhode Island 
Exchange will be an active purchaser, contracting with carriers and determining which 
insurers are allowed to participate.  The Rhode Island Healthcare Reform Commission, 
which provides guidance to the Rhode Island Exchange Board, recommended two models 
based on the FEHB and the Massachusetts Health Connector for the Rhode Island 
exchange to follow (Rhode Island Healthcare Reform Commission 2011). 
 
Vermont  
Out of all states, Vermont has proposed the most radical changes in its health 
insurance and health care markets.  These will begin with the creation of the state’s health 
benefits exchange, and culminate in the creation of the first single-payer system in the 
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United States.  Governor Peter Shumlin passed the landmark bill containing this plan, HB 
202, on May 26, 2011.  It created a publicly financed program called Green Mountain 
Care designed to provide all Vermont residents with comprehensive, affordable and high-
quality health care while containing health care costs.  It also created the state-operated 
Vermont Health Benefits Exchange in the Department of Vermont Health Access 
(DVHA) to comply with ACA regulations effective in 2014.  In 2017, the state plans to 
request a waiver from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to transition to 
Green Mountain Care which will provide coverage to all its residents.   In the meantime 
Vermont’s exchange will be administered by DVHA and overseen by the Green 
Mountain Care Board, which is responsible for the state’s health care system’s progress 
towards the realization of Green Mountain Care (State Exchange Profiles: Vermont, 
uploaded February 6, 2012).  
The Vermont exchange will selectively contract with health plans, including at 
least two private insurers and two multi-state plans, as long as these meet requirements 
set by the DVHA Commissioner.  Although HB 202 mandates that health insurers charge 
the same premium if the same plan is offered both inside and outside the exchange, HB 
559, which was introduced in January 2012, would completely ban insurance sales to 
individuals and small employers outside of the exchange.  The bill also defines small 
businesses as those with up to 100 employees and merges the small group and individual 
insurance markets.  These measures would essentially maximize the exchange’s potential 
bargaining power (without including the large group market which will continue to 
operate outside of the exchange) against health insurers.  A competing bill, SB 208, was 
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also introduced which would set the size of small employers to those with 50 or fewer 
employees and require that health insurance be available for the individuals and small 
groups both inside and outside the exchange. 
 
Health Benefits Exchanges Established as a Result of the ACA: Quasi-governmental 
Active Purchaser 
California 
Former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed two bills (SB 900 and AB 
1602) establishing the California Health Benefit Exchange on September 10, 2010, 
making the state the first in the nation to pass legislation to create a health insurance 
exchange under ACA.  The Exchange was created as an independent public entity within 
the state government, and is overseen by a 5-member Board.  The Board is currently 
collaborating with stakeholders and contracting with consulting firms to develop 
minimum requirements for health plans participating in the Exchange.  State legislation 
requires all carriers participating in the Exchange or operating in the private market to 
offer at least one health plan at each of four coverage levels.   Additionally, health 
insurance carriers may offer catastrophic plans through the exchange only.  California is 
hoping that these measures will reduce the risk of adverse selection which could threaten 
the sustainability of their state exchange. 
California’s exchange will draw upon the state’s previous experiences as an active 
purchaser for existing programs like its small-business purchasing pool and state 
employee purchasing pool, and selectively contract with insurance carriers to “provide 
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health coverage choices that offer the optimal combination of choice, value, quality and 
service” (State Exchange Profiles: California, uploaded March 26, 2012).  Although 
California is currently developing two separate exchanges to cater to individual and 
small-groups, state legislation allows the Board to reevaluate this structure in 2018. 
 
Connecticut 
The Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange was established by SB 921, signed 
by Governor Dan Malloy on July 1, 2011.  The Exchange is a quasi-governmental 
organization, defined as “a body politic and corporate, constituting a public 
instrumentality and political subdivision of the state… which shall not be construed to be 
a department, institution or agency of the state” (Connecticut Senate 2011, Senate Bill 
No.921).  The Board is currently comprised of 14 members, although legislation has been 
introduced that would add two additional Board members.  The Exchange will function 
as an active purchaser, using criteria developed by the Board to select plans to offer 
through the exchange to ensure that individuals and employers are provided an 
“adequate” number and selection of choices.  Participating carriers must offer certain, 
minimum plan types and charge the same premiums if they offer the same plan outside of 
the Exchange.  Carriers must also publicly justify premium increases for plans offered 
through the Exchange.  
The Board’s first set of recommendations for the development of the exchange 
was released at the beginning of 2012.  The Board’s recommendations include combining 
the individual and small group exchanges while maintaining separate risk pools for each 
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market, maintaining the definition of a small employer to those with 50 or fewer 
employees, rather than accepting the ACA’s larger definition of a small employer, and 
implementing a small assessment on premiums to help fund the Exchange (State 
Exchange Profiles: Connecticut, uploaded March 15, 2012). 
 
District of Columbia 
On January 17, 2012, Mayor Vincent Gray signed Act 19-269, establishing the 
District of Columbia Health Benefit Exchange Authority as an “independent authority of 
the District government” (State Exchange Profiles: D.C., uploaded March 21, 2012).  The 
Exchange is governed by an 11-member board which, similar to the Connecticut 
exchange board, will act as an active purchaser to ensure that individuals and employers 
using the Exchange have an adequate number and selection of choices.  Carriers 
participating in the Exchange must provide certain, minimum plan types in the individual 
and small-group exchanges.  The same plan offered outside of the exchange must charge 
the same premium as the same plan offered within the exchange.  The Health Reform 
Implementation Committee, which advises the Exchange Board, continues to meet and is 
still formulating its recommendations for the exchange structure, including those 
regarding the separation or combination of the individual and small-group markets, risk 
pooling, plan requirements, and others. 
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Oregon  
Governor John Kitzhaber signed SB 99 into law on June 22, 2011, establishing 
the Oregon Health Insurance Exchange Corporation.  The Corporation is a “public 
corporation performing government functions and exercising governmental powers” and 
governed by a 9-member board (Oregon House 2011, H.B. 3137).  Oregon’s exchange 
can act as an active purchaser and limit the number of qualified plans offered through the 
exchange as long as the same restrictions are applied to all carriers.  The Legislature 
recently passed HB 4164, which approved the Corporation’s business plan.  Like a 
majority of other states, Oregon’s exchange will not combine the individual and small-
group markets but does ensure that premiums for the same plan outside and inside the 
exchange are the same.  The small-group market will also function based on a defined 
contribution design that will allow employers to set their contribution amount and allow 
employees to choose an appropriate plan from those offered through the exchange.  
Although no specific methods are outlined, Oregon is researching possible risk 
adjustment programs to manage potential adverse selection.  The plan also includes the 
assessment of an administrative fee on insurance carriers to fund the Exchange after 2014 
once its federal grant funding decreases.  
 
Health Benefits Exchanges Established as a Result of the ACA: Non-profit 
Clearinghouse 
 
 
 118 
Hawaii 
The Hawaii Health Connector was established in SB 1348, signed by Governor 
Neil Abercrombie on July 11, 2011.  Unlike most other state exchanges, the Connector is 
a non-profit corporation governed by a 15-member board appointed by the Governor with 
the consent of the Senate.  The Connector will operate as a clearing house for information 
on all qualified plans listed or offered through the Connector.  The Hawaii Insurance 
Commissioner will maintain regulatory jurisdiction over health plans and will determine 
whether plans meet federal qualifications, and thus participate in the Connector.  The 
individual and small-group market (of employers with up to 50 employees) will be served 
through two separate programs and with separate risk pools.  Insurance carriers offering 
plans in the small-group market will be required to also offer plans in the individual 
market. 
One of Hawaii’s greatest concerns with the implementation of health care reform 
is preserving the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (PPHCA) of 1974.  The act created the 
only employer mandate in the U.S., which required an exemption from ERISA by then-
President Nixon.  The act requires all employers to provide health insurance for any 
permanent employee working at least 20 hours a week for four consecutive weeks in 
Hawaii.  It required certain employer contributions and limited employee contributions 
based on income.  The Connector Board has stated its intent to seek waivers from any 
federal policies that may conflict with PPHCA (Hawaii Health Connector Interim Board 
of Directors Report to the 2012 Legislature, 2011). 
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Health Benefits Exchanges Established as a Result of the ACA: Quasi-governmental 
Clearinghouse  
Colorado 
Colorado enacted legislation established a quasi-governmental clearing house in 
the spring of 2011.  Further details are provided in the main section of this paper. 
 
Other State Exchanges 
Washington 
Washington Governor Christine Gergoire signed SB 5445 into law on May 11, 
2011, establishing the Washington Health Benefit Exchange as a “self-sustaining public-
private partnership separate and distinct from the state” (State Exchange Profiles: 
Washington, uploaded March 15, 2012).  It is governed by an 11-member Board that 
receives substantial assistance from the Washington Health Care Authority, which 
currently operates various public health programs.  HB 2319, which clarifies some 
features of the Exchange, was just recently passed and signed by the Governor.  It 
prohibits carriers from offering any catastrophic plans outside of the Exchange.  It also 
requires that carriers offer qualified individual or small-group plans outside of the 
Exchange in order to participate in the Exchange.  The legislation also gives the Board 
the authority to determine whether benefit packages meet the minimum standards for 
qualified health plans, which will be pegged to the largest small group plan in the state. 
 
 
 120 
Maryland 
On April 12, 2011, Governor Martin O’Malley signed SB 182/HB 166, creating 
the Maryland Health Benefit Exchange as a “public corporation and independent unit of 
state government” (State Exchange Profiles: Maryland, uploaded February 22, 2012).  
The Exchange is governed by a 9-member Board whose research into the possible 
structure and operation of the Exchange has been included in legislation that was 
introduced in December 2011.  The legislation would allow any eligible plan to 
participate in the Exchange in 2014.  After its first year of operation, the Exchange would 
gain the authority to become an active purchaser and engage in competitive bidding and 
negotiate with insurance carriers.  The individual and small-group markets (employers 
with up to 50 employees) would remain separate until 2017, when the Exchange may 
decide to combine these markets.  In the established legislation, carriers participating in 
the Exchange must offer certain plans outside of the exchange and may not charge 
different premiums for the same plan inside and outside of the Exchange.  The proposed 
legislation would also require carriers with revenues over a certain threshold to offer 
products through the Exchange. 
 
Nevada 
Nevada’s Silver State Health Insurance Exchange was established by SB 440, and 
signed by Governor Brian Sandoval on June 16, 2011.  The exchange was created as a 
quasi-governmental organization governed by a 10-member board.  The Board is 
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currently researching the structure of their Exchange (State Exchange Profiles: Nevada, 
uploaded February 23, 2012). 
 
West Virginia 
The West Virginia Health Benefits Exchange was established through SB 408, 
and signed by Governor Earl Ray Tomblin on April 5, 2011.  The West Virginia 
exchange was established as an entity within the Offices of the Insurance Commissioner, 
governed by a 10-member board (State Exchange Profiles: West Virginia, uploaded 
February 17, 2012).  West Virginia is still in the process of appointing board members 
and the Office of the Insurance Commissioner is researching the structure and rules for 
their Exchange.   
